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ABSTRACT 
The central theme of this thesis is how local law enforcement (LE) can integrate 
counterterrorism (CT) into its traditional mission. The basis of this research is that local 
LE is well positioned to be significant contributors and can use its existing strengths in a 
CT role to enhance homeland security (HS). In the 13 years since September 11, 2001, it 
is unknown to what extent CT has been fully embraced by local LE. This question is not 
easy to answer, as it is not easily quantifiable; this level of LE comprises nearly 18,000 
individual agencies. This thesis asserts that doing nothing is unacceptable and argues that 
integration is an important part of securing the homeland. This thesis proposes the 
development of a conceptual prescriptive model known as L.E.A.D, leadership, education 
and training, actively gather intelligence, and detect terrorists. L.E.A.D asserts that HS 
starts with hometown security, which begins by individual local LE agencies leading the 
way toward the integration of CT into their existing missions.  
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In the 13 years since 9/11, it is unknown to what extent counterterrorism (CT) has been 
fully embraced by local law enforcement (LE). This question is not easy to answer, as it 
is not easily quantifiable; this level of LE is comprised of nearly 18,000 individual 
agencies, and the CT mission manifests itself differently from agency to agency. 
According to Jack K. Riley et al., in Think Locally: Act Nationally, “Virtually 
everyone agrees that the U.S. war on terrorism should involve local and state agencies. 
Nonetheless, to date, such efforts have been spotty, incomplete, and devoid of a 
coordinated national strategy.”1 Key to the effort of thwarting terror plots is the more 
than 17,000 state and local LE agencies that collectively represent terrorism’s “first-line 
preventers.” Despite the vast size of this network, and the growing recognition of their 
importance in the CT process, state and local resources are still commonly underutilized. 
This thesis seeks to determine how local LE can integrate CT into its traditional 
mission. The core of this research is that local LE is well positioned to be significant 
contributors and can use their existing strengths in a CT role to enhance homeland 
security (HS). 
L.E.A.D. MODEL 
The L.E.A.D. model is characterized by the following acronym.  
L—LEAD 
E—EDUCATE & TRAIN 
A—ACTIVELY COLLECT INTELLIGENCE 
D—DETECT TERRORISTS 
Lead (L): This thesis asserts that HS does start with hometown security, and 
begins by individual local LE agencies leading the way toward the integration of CT into 
their missions, which begins with an understanding of the threat. Local LE leaders must 
1 Jack K. Riley et al., “Think Locally, Act Nationally: Police Efforts in Fighting Terrorism Need 
Greater Federal Leadership,” RAND Corporation, 24–29, Spring 2006, http://www.rand.org/pubs/ 
periodicals/rand-review/issues/spring2006/police.html.  
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educate themselves on the threat of terror from homegrown and international entities. 
Only then will they begin to understand the ideologies, tactics, and methods of those who 
would seek to do harm in their communities. The next step is to develop viable 
relationships with a regional fusion center and a Federal Bureau of Investigation—Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (FBI-JTTF) to foster two-way information sharing. Thirdly, 
explore federal grant funding opportunities to facilitate CT activity. Once terrorism is 
understood, an agency must acknowledge that the threat exists and incorporate this 
possibility into its strategic plan.  
Education & Training (E): This topic starts with a holistic approach of raising 
the terrorism intelligence quotient (IQ) within each individual locality that includes local 
LE, other local government agencies, citizens, elected officials, and the private sector. 
Local LE can lead this effort by first educating and training themselves and then 
developing training programs that target the aforementioned groups. Local training can 
be accomplished through participation in “no cost” Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) training programs available on-line, “in house,” or off site, such as the State and 
Local Law Enforcement Anti-Terrorism Training Program (SLATT) by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ). A start for local LE in this direction is to identify and 
develop an “in house” subject matter expert (SME) through the aforementioned training 
opportunity. These individuals can provide CT instruction to department personnel at all 
levels and liaise with state and federal partners on issues related to HS. An important 
aspect of this role is that it can be performed in duality with existing duties, much like a 
field training officer or firearms instructor; it does not disrupt core service, but does 
provide an agency-based SME to coordinate CT activity. 
In the protection of local communities, local LE cannot be the only contributor or 
entity engaged in CT. This thesis asserts that LE should be the catalyst for CT locally, but 
that a holistic approach is needed to include the training and education of other 
government agencies, elected officials, the community, and the private sector to assist in 
CT. This approach ties into the third component of L.E.A.D., the active gathering of 
intelligence from local communities related to terrorism.  
 xiv 
Actively Gather Intelligence (A): Local LE is already heavily engaged in 
intelligence gathering related to traditional criminal activity; once a department’s 
personnel have been trained and educated on terrorism, all that is needed is the “how” 
and “who” to share information related to terrorism. Engagement in suspicious activity 
reports (SAR) is a “no brainer” for local LE. Once command and field personnel have 
been initially trained, SARs can be quickly integrated into existing policing efforts. This 
thesis asserts that terrorism-related information is different from traditional criminal 
information, in that such information may have national or international implications, and 
therefore, it is of vital importance to share terrorism-related information in a timely and 
standardized manner with local FBI-JTTF and state fusion centers. National SAR 
Initiative (NSI) documents found within this thesis provide detailed guidelines for the 
implementation of SAR at the local level.  
Local LE officers have numerous opportunities during the performance of their 
duties to gather intelligence related to terrorism. It is assumed that local police conduct 
daily debriefs of arrestees, suspicious persons, confidential sources, and concerned 
citizens on a host of issues related to traditional criminal activity. Thus, an opportunity 
exists for CT integration, with minimal disruption of existing practices. In an effort to 
detect and mitigate terrorist activity, local LE questioning and consensual contact can 
slightly shift to include inquiries also related to extremism and radicalization. A 
significant factor in successfully thwarting an attack is to develop information and 
identify the perpetrators pre-attack, as terrorists operate in the shadows and do not 
operate overtly. The final element of L.E.A.D. is the goal of the first three components, 
the detection of terrorists who may be planning or hiding within a local community. 
Detect (D): Jonathan White states that the task facing American police is not so 
much the incorporation of new tactics or technologies, but the establishment of a CT 
mindset in everyday LE operations. No community in America can remain 100% 
immune from violence or terror, but local LE is duty bound to use all the tools and 
resources available, to protect, lead, and educate their citizenry in respect to terrorism. It 
is the view of this thesis that a failure to engage in CT at the local LE level, not only 
 xv 
creates a significant gap for overall United States (U.S.) HS, but is also a negligence of 
duty.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The L.E.A.D. model provides a simple and flexible model designed to assist any 
local LE entity to evolve from zero or little engagement in CT, to a comprehensive 
integration that becomes part of an agency’s deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). It is a 
progressive model reliant on following the steps in sequential order, but is based upon a 
low-tech, easy-to-develop and low-cost application that can be expanded into Anytown, 
USA.  
It is recommended that local LE agencies without a CT strategy consider L.E.A.D 
as an alternative to doing nothing. Local departments need only to envision themselves 
post-attack, and ask why they did not integrate CT into their policing strategies, when 
they may have had the opportunity to make a difference and save lives.  
 xvi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First, I would like to thank Dr. Lauren Wolman and Patrick E. Miller for their 
patience, support, and assistance in guiding me through this project. Their insight and 
dedication toward my success were an invaluable resource. 
My entire experience at the Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security (CHDS), master’s program has been outstanding, due to the 
exceptional level of instruction and interaction from faculty and staff, which made this 
program a “life changing” and extremely worthwhile endeavor. In addition, the 
friendships developed in Cohorts 1303/1304 through our “pain and suffering” of this 
thesis project and CHDS are relationships that will be long lasting.  
Secondly, I would like to thank and recognize Richmond Police Department 
Deputy Chief John Buturla, who brought this program to my attention, recommended me, 
and supported me through the end, as did many members of the Richmond Police 
Department.  
Finally, I would like to thank my wife, daughter, and son, who went above and 
beyond in their support, patience, and help, in working to get me through this project over 
the past 18 months. They each made many sacrifices throughout, but were always 
available to encourage and keep me going! 
 
 xvii 




A. PROBLEM SPACE 
“Virtually everyone agrees that the U.S. war on terrorism should involve local and 
state agencies. Nonetheless, to date, such efforts have been spotty, incomplete, and 
devoid of a coordinated national strategy.”1 Key to the effort of thwarting terror plots are 
the more than 17,000 state and local law enforcement (LE) agencies that collectively 
represent terrorism’s “first-line preventers.”2 Despite the vast size of this network, and 
the growing recognition of their importance in the counterterrorism (CT) process, state 
and local resources are still commonly underutilized. While regional and state fusion 
centers have helped promote partnerships and information sharing, considerable 
challenges remain.3 
The aforementioned points to this thesis’ main research questions of how local LE 
can integrate CT into their traditional policing mission, and what are the key components 
of integration? What existing strategies or tools can be applied by local LE to enhance the 
synergy of these two activities? Do simple, low-cost strategies that complement rather 
than disrupt traditional crime fighting duties exist; and can they be used by Anytown, 
USA in the protection of their locality and the enhancement of overall national homeland 
security (HS)?  
Academic studies reviewed for this thesis that assessed the role of local LE in CT, 
reveal that in many instances, locals do not prioritize CT, and in fact, dedicate limited 
resources to this area. A distinction can also be drawn between larger departments, which 
have more manpower, resources, and threat potential, and smaller agencies with limited 
resources and a reduced threat of attack, as contributors to a lack of involvement in CT.  
1 Jack K. Riley et al., “Think Locally, Act Nationally: Police Efforts in Fighting Terrorism Need 
Greater Federal Leadership,” RAND Corporation, 24–29, Spring 2006, http://www.rand.org/pubs/ 
periodicals/rand-review/issues/spring2006/police.html. 
2 Kevin Strom et al., “Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. 




                                                 
Michael Andreas examined issues impacting LE integration and CT in his 2008 
Naval Postgraduate School thesis, in which he asserts that many municipal police chiefs 
accept the status quo and create an atmosphere in which long-standing practices and 
methodologies are memorialized.4 In some cases, Andreas notes, local agencies are 
hampered by complacency and a “business as usual” mentality: “Police leaders do not 
fully comprehend the threat of terrorism or the significant positions their agencies can 
occupy in America’s homeland security strategy. They continue to go about their daily 
lives, concentrating on traditional crime, as if they and their communities are uniquely 
immune from terrorists and their lethal schemes.”5 This mentality is a significant 
impediment to CT integration, as a failure to acknowledge, understand and recognize the 
threat of terrorism can represent a major impediment toward an agency’s decision to 
incorporate CT into their existing mission. 
This thesis argues that regardless of size, populous, or perceived threat, all 
agencies at the local level have the capability and an obligation, as public safety entities, 
to contribute in a CT role. The integration of policing and CT is not directed at the idea of 
local LE taking the lead on terror investigations, but rather the infusion of CT into the 
policing continuum or mindset. A relevant example can be found within the routine 
policing response to the crimes of burglary or robbery, which are commonplace, and for 
which training and operating procedures are standardized. At present, a consistent 
approach by local LE toward crimes of terror that are potentially being plotted within 
their jurisdictions does not exist.  
Traditionally, local LE has concerned itself primarily with preventing and solving 
crimes, such as burglary, theft, and robbery; crimes that have an immediate and visible 
impact on the local community and affect citizens quality of life. In the face of unknown 
future terrorist threats, however, local LE organizations will have to adapt existing 
policing strategies to fulfill the requirement of HS.6 The U.S. National Strategy for 
4 Michael D. Andreas, “How Should Municipal Police Agencies Participate in America’s Homeland 
Security Strategy” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 4. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Jose Docobo, “Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at the 
Local Law Enforcement Level,” Homeland Security Affairs Journal 1, no. 1 (June 2005): 4.  
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Homeland Security defines HS as, “A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks 
within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the 
damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”7  
On April 15, 2013, the Boston Marathon bombings signified the unfortunate and 
horrific reality that terrorism can strike anywhere and at anytime within the United States 
(U.S.) homeland. In August 2014, federal authorities urged LE across the country to be 
alert for possible attacks inside the United States in retaliation for U.S. airstrikes against 
the Islamic group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In a joint bulletin issued to local, 
state and federal LE, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FBI said that 
while they were “unaware of any specific, credible threats against the Homeland,” they 
could rule out attacks in the United States from sympathizers radicalized by the group’s 
online propaganda.8 These examples reaffirm the significance of a committed effort by 
local LE to leverage their existing strengths in traditional crime fighting toward an 
engagement in CT. 
Local LE stands in a unique position to be contributors to HS by combining their 
existing duties toward a role in CT, which is defined in the U.S. Army Field Manual as, 
“Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and 
respond to terrorism.”9 Although domestic LE efforts stand in stark contrast to military 
operations, the LE approach to CT is to incapacitate terrorists via the legal system with 
minimal force, and to involve criminal investigation and due process.10  
The local level of LE provides 24/7 policing service to their communities and is 
comprised of nearly 18,000 individual agencies spread across the nation.11 The primary 
7 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Department 
of Homeland Security, 2007), 3. 
8 Mike Levine, “Homeland Warns of ISIS Retaliation in U.S. by Sympathizers,” ABCNews, August 
22, 2014, http://abcnews.go.com/US/homeland-warns-isis-retaliation-us-sympathizers/story?id=25087995. 
9 Jason Rineheart, “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 5 
(2010), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/122/html. 
10 Nadav Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons (New York: Wiley and Sons, 
2011), 63–65. 
11 Brian Reaves and Matthew J. Hickman, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 
2000 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2002), 1. 
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policing philosophy employed today is community policing (CP). CP is a philosophy that 
promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and 
problem-solving techniques, to address proactively the immediate conditions that give 
rise to public safety issues, such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.12  
Stanley Supinski, director of Partnership Programs at the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS), says, “Research is clearly 
showing that implementing community oriented policing strategies and tactics can assist 
law enforcement agencies with preventing both crime and terrorism.”13 A strategy that 
combines local LE and community networks with existing crime fighting efforts 
seemingly makes sense, as both are aimed at targeting those who seek to commit violence 
within society.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The basis of this research is that local LE is well positioned to be significant 
contributors in the HS enterprise; experts, government leaders, and entities from within 
the HS community, who assert that CT should be part of the local LE continuum, 
reaffirm this point. Locals possess strong attributes, such as proximity to the public, 
existing community networks, and intelligence collection capabilities that could all be 
beneficial to a role in CT.  
This thesis seeks to examine how local LE can local fully integrate CT at the 
leadership, education and training, and intelligence levels, and proposes a conceptual 
model of local LE and CT integration. 
12 Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Community Policing Defined (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2003), 3. 
13 Douglas Page, “Community Policing or Homeland Security: A ‘Sophie’s Choice’ for Police?,” 
Officer.com, September 12, 2011, http://www.officer.com/article/10325312/community-policing-or-
homeland-security-sophies-choice-for-police.  
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C. HYPOTHESES 
Although it is clear that a gap of engagement in CT at the local level exists, it is 
partly attributable to prioritization, competition with traditional crime, confusion, apathy, 
and resistance, along with numerous other impediments to doing it.  
This thesis asserts that doing nothing is an unacceptable condition and argues that 
LE and CT integration is imperative to securing the homeland and must become part of 
local LE’s deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). In the protection of their communities, the 
threat of terrorism cannot be ignored by local LE or shouldered by only two levels of 
government. This thesis proposes the development of a conceptual prescriptive model 
demonstrating how LE and CT can be integrated in Anytown, USA within their 
traditional mission. Considering that the average size of an American police department 
is 42 sworn officers, the development of an all-encompassing model to integrate LE and 
CT would need to be applied in an environment of minimal resources, limited 
technological augmentation, and minimal disruption of traditional LE duties to 
accommodate any size department.14  
Through a review of scholarly articles, academic research, government 
publications, and smart practices related to local LE and CT this thesis seeks to build a 
conceptual model centered on three topical areas that transect local LE and CT. These 
topics were selected based upon the importance of each, in relation to the subject of this 
thesis: “The integration of counterterrorism into the DNA of American policing.” 
The first topical area is leadership, which was identified due to its significance as 
the catalyst for change or transformation of an organization at the strategic level. In the 
application of a new or different activity, direction and buy-in from organizational 
leadership is an essential component of development. Secondly, in the implementation of 
a new idea, concept, or strategy, education and training is a fundamental component of 
the process. Its significance is rooted in providing an initial foundation of knowledge for 
new, veteran, and specialized officers in the area of CT, as well as a continual platform to 
14 David H. Bayley and David Weisburd, “Cops and Spooks: The Role of Police in Counterterrorism,” 
in To Protect and to Serve, ed. David Weisburd, Thomas Feucht, Idit Hakimi, Lois Mock, and Simon Perry 
(New York: Springer Science, 2011), ch. 4, 81–95. 
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educate on evolving issues related to the field of terrorism. The third area, intelligence 
gathering, was identified because it is an existing core competency of local LE. Based 
upon local LE’s existing collection capacity, proximity to the citizenry, and existing 
networks,  local LE can make a significant contribution to the HS spectrum in this area.  
D. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
In assessing the integration of local LE and CT, research has determined that 
strategies and practices vary, as they are spread across the thousands of individual 
agencies that comprise this level. Local engagement ranges from zero involvement in CT 
to the examples of two of the largest police departments in the country that are leading 
the way in local CT efforts. The New York Police Department (NYPD) deploys its own 
informants, undercover terror-busters, and a small army of analysts; a preventive 
approach that former Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly calls the most effective way 
for police departments, small or large, to fight terrorism.15 The Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) agrees, and states that a key way to crush incipient terrorist cells and 
thwart terrorism is to use local laws and follow locally generated leads, which is what 
good police departments do best. Relying on this low-key approach, the LAPD has 
arrested some 200 American citizens and foreigners with suspected ties to terrorist groups 
since September 11, 2001 (9/11).16  
Understandably, most local agencies cannot replicate the efforts of the NYPD and 
LAPD, nor should they, but this thesis asserts that doing nothing is an unacceptable 
condition. Local LE is already actively engaged in traditional criminal investigations and 
intelligence gathering within their jurisdictions. The United States has approximately 
708,022 full-time sworn police officers compared with 11,633 Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) special agents of who only about 2,200 work directly on terrorism.17 
This disparity of personnel affords local LE a greater opportunity to develop sources of 
15 Judith Miller, “On the Front Line in the War on Terrorism,” City Journal, Summer 2007, 
http://www.cjgsu.net/initiatives/on_the_front_line.htm. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Bayley and Weisburd, “Cops and Spooks: The Role of the Police in Counterterrorism,” 91. 
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information or have contact with suspicious persons, as locals have a much greater 
presence on the streets throughout the country.  
Some in the LE community have made the assertion that CT should be an integral 
part of the local policing continuum. Two such advocates for the greater involvement of 
police in preventing terrorism are renowned criminologist George L. Kelling, and NYPD 
Commissioner William J. Bratton, an expert on modern day policing. They state, 
“Counter-terrorism has to be woven into the everyday workings of every department. It 
should be included on the agenda of every meeting, and this new role must be imparted to 
officers on the street so that terrorism prevention becomes part of their everyday 
thinking.”18 This integration has not consistently occurred throughout the local LE 
environment, especially in smaller agencies. This lack of integration is attributable to a 
variety of factors impacting local CT. These factors include an unclear need for doing it, 
especially in communities with few known terrorist agents or events, the costs of doing it, 
especially in the face of shrinking budgets, and unclear ways of doing it in a manner that 
does not disrupt core LE services or damage community relations.  
This thesis responds to those questions, concerns, and challenges by asking what 
an ideal model for local LE and CT integration might look like, based upon the 
examination of three core components of the traditional policing mission: leadership, 
education and training, and intelligence gathering. Essentially, integration will be 
outlined as a local agency incorporating CT as a core competency of its policing duties, 
similarly, to how traditional methods are used in relation to issues, such as robbery, 
burglary, and traffic accidents that are part of an agency’s standard operating procedures 
(DNA). The integration of CT and policing would be exhibited by an agency’s inclusion 
of CT into its policing mission and involve the following three topical areas that intersect 
with CT and policing. 
• Leadership—defined by the prioritization of CT by executive leadership 
and expressed in policies and procedures 
18 Ronald V. Clarke and Graeme R. Newman, “Police and the Prevention of Terrorism,” Policing: A 
Journal of Policy and Practice 1, 9–10 (2007), http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/9.abstract. 
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• Training/Education—inclusion in department education at the basic, in-
service and specialized levels, to include other government, community, 
and private sector entities  
• Intelligence Gathering—policies and procedures for collection, analysis, 
and sharing of intelligence related to HS  
This research looks to identify factors within each of the above components that 
influence integration in seeking to develop a prescriptive model based upon the 
identification of smart practices that can be utilized by all local LE executives to work 
toward integrating CT into their traditional LE mission. 
E. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
A continual theme of this thesis is that CT application can be integrated as another 
layer in the overall operations of a local LE agency. Just as strategies for combating 
traditional threats are applied to the policing mission, CT does not have to “drive the 
policing train,” but based on the continual threat, in the protection of local communities, 
terrorism should be one of the cars in the train.  
The development of a conceptual model to integrate local LE and CT serves as a 
starting point or enhancement for locals to think, train, and gather intelligence within 
their communities related to terrorism, in an overall effort to foster improved national 
HS. It is not the intention of this thesis to develop a “one size fits all” model, as it is not 
practical for the thousands of agencies that comprise this level and vary in size, 
geography, and population. Eugene Bardach states that smart practices are internally 
complex and content-sensitive,19 and  that it should be left to local implementers to figure 
out the details of the generic practice that makes sense in their own context.20 Allowing 
for the local adaptation of nonessential features not only serves common sense but also 
encourages greater buy-in by the locals in that it is being imported from the outside.21 A 
CT integration model could be personalized to the needs, resources, and threats of 
19 Eugene Bardach, Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 




                                                 
individual localities and is intended to be simple, flexible, and broad in scope to foster 
acceptance and facilitation.  
F. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
Perceptions of the current terrorist threat have changed over the past 
decade. In the immediate shadow of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, intelligence efforts focused on preventing another catastrophic 
terrorist attack from abroad. There was also concern that al Qaeda sleeper 
cells might already be present in the United States. They turned out not to 
exist there was no jihadist underground in place, although al Qaeda has 
inspired a number of local terrorist plots since 9/11.22  
As the threat of terrorism progresses, LE has an opportunity to impact their 
locality positively. By having superior knowledge of their specific patrol jurisdictions, 
they can work as the eyes and ears of U.S. CT efforts and are much more likely to come 
across a terrorism suspect than a federal LE agent simply due to the law of probability.23 
This knowledge is seemingly a strong attribute, as one of the most significant reasons 
why local police departments can and should play a vital role in American CT efforts is 
the size of their collection resources, which dwarf those of the federal government. 
Although policymakers, the news media, and general public continue to conceptualize 
terrorism and CT as an activity best addressed by national resources, the potential 
personnel and material resources of local and state LE far exceed those of Washington.24 
The failure to apply the strengths of local policing in a CT role may create an opening 
that results in deadly local consequences, such as a successful terrorist attack in an 
American community.  
22 Brian M. Jenkins, Andrew Liepman, and Henry H. Willis, “Identifying Enemies among Us: 
Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence Collection and 
Information Sharing,” RAND Corporation, 1, 2014, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ 
conf_proceedings/CF300/CF317/RAND_CF317.pdf. 
23 Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, “The “Lone Wolf” Disconnect,” Security Weekly, Stratfor.com, 
January 30, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/lone_wolf_disconnect. 
24 David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law 
Enforcement Agencies, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services, 2009), 4. 
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G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The structure of this thesis is designed to start out by providing the reader in 
Chapter I with an understanding of the problem and its significance. This section is 
followed by research questions, and a thesis overview of the topical areas to be examined.  
Chapter II is a review of literature related to the threat of terrorism, CT and 
policing, and the topical areas of leadership, education and training and intelligence 
gathering.  
The intent of Chapter III is to describe the current threat and implications for local 
LE related to terrorism, which is followed by a detailed examination of post-9/11 policing 
that outlines the benefits and issues related to local LE implementation of a CT strategy.  
Chapters IV–VI are centered on the three core competencies for local integration 
of CT and LE. In Chapter IV, local LE leadership is the focal point with an emphasis on 
local ownership, organizational culture, and obstacles related to the integration of CT and 
LE. Chapter V is concentrated on training and education for local LE at numerous levels 
and how it impacts the integration of CT into the traditional policing mission. Chapter VI 
examines the intelligence-gathering component of CT at the local level and is divided 
into numerous sub-chapters that explore local efforts, suspicious activity reports (SAR) 
and intelligence led policing (ILP).  
The final chapter, Chapter VII, provides a conceptual prescriptive model known 
as L.E.A.D., or leadership, education and training, actively collect, detect, to assist 
Anytown, USA with a simple and flexible strategy to apply CT into their existing 
policing mission. This model uses elements of the aforementioned core competencies, 
leadership, education, and intelligence gathering for local LE and CT integration. 
L.E.A.D is based on the research and resources available to local LE and smart practices 
that may be applicable. 
 10 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review includes the following areas of focus: (1) government 
documents outlining the present day threat of terror to the U.S. homeland, (2) academic 
research and studies related to the existing conditions of CT and policing, (3) literature 
promoting the importance of executive leadership toward the integration of CT and 
policing and known obstacles, (4) research and government documents that relate to the 
state of training and education for local police in the area of CT, and (5) academic 
studies, reports, and government guides that assess and provide guidance on the 
intelligence gathering efforts of local police in CT. 
A. THREAT 
In the application of CT by local LE, an understanding of the threat is an essential 
element in the integration of this activity. Bruce Hoffman, author of Inside Terrorism, is 
one of the world’s foremost experts on terrorism; his book has remained a seminal work 
for understanding the historical evolution of terrorism and the terrorist mindset.25 
Hoffman states, “It is useful to distinguish terrorists from ordinary criminals. Like 
terrorists, criminals use violence as a means to attain a specific end. However, while the 
violent act itself may be similar, the purpose or motivation clearly is different. The 
criminal is not concerned with influencing or affecting public opinion.”26  
The threat of terrorism is rooted in two sources, foreign-based threats, and 
domestic or homegrown threats. The National Counterterrorism Center’s 2011 Report on 
Terrorism outlines the global threat of terror, which documents that over 10,000 terrorist 
attacks occurred in 2011 that affected nearly 45,000 victims in 70 countries and resulted 
in over 12,500 deaths.27 With respect to the threat of terrorism on U.S. soil, Peter Bergen 
and Bruce Hoffman state,  
25 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 
26 Ibid., 36. 
27 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2011 Report on Terrorism (Washington, DC: 
National Counterterrorism Center, 2012), 9. 
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Al-Qaeda and allied groups continue to pose a threat to the United States. 
Although it is less severe than the catastrophic proportions of a 9/11-like 
attack, the threat today is more complex and more diverse than at any time 
over the past nine years. Al-Qaeda or its allies continue to have the 
capacity to kill dozens, or even hundreds, of Americans in a single 
attack.28  
They describe the complexity of the threat this way:  
A key shift in the past couple of years is the increasingly prominent role in 
planning and operations that U.S. citizens and residents have played in the 
leadership of al-Qaeda and aligned groups, and the higher numbers of 
Americans attaching themselves to these groups. Another development is 
the increasing diversification of the types of U.S.-based jihadist militants, 
and the groups with which those militants have affiliated.29 
Local LE must recognize that terrorist activity is not exclusive to “Jihadists.” An 
analysis of thwarted terrorist plots between 1999–2009 by the Institute for Homeland 
Security Solutions reports that Al Qaeda and Allied Movements (AQAM) and AQAM 
inspired plots were responsible for a plurality of attacks in their study (40 out of 86). 
White supremacist and militia/anti-government groups were also responsible for a 
significant number of attacks (20 and 12 plots, respectively).30 A 2013 Congressional 
Research Service report specifically focused on the domestic threat of terror and revealed 
that while plots and attacks by foreign-inspired homegrown violent jihadists have 
certainly earned more media attention, domestic terrorists have been busy, and noted that 
in terms of casualties on U.S. soil, Oklahoma City is second only to the events of 9/11.31  
It is important to recognize that a terrorist organization does not need to be 
physically within U.S. borders. Evidence of al Qaeda’s (AQ’s) efforts to inspire acts of 
terror can clearly be found in the online magazine named Inspire, which is published by 
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). American investigators concurred that after 
28 Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat, A Report of the Bipartisan 
Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group,” Bipartisan Policy Center, 15, September 10, 2010, 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%20Final%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf.  
29 Ibid. 
30 Strom et al., “Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist 
Plots, 1999–2009,” 7. 
31 Jerome P. Bjelopera, The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS 
Report No. R42536) (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2013), 2. 
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the Boston Marathon attack, the Tsarnaev brothers were careful and obedient readers of 
Inspire.32 They have also become the poster boys for the new breed of grassroots and 
“lone wolf” jihadists who are changing the nature of terrorism. In recent years, as it has 
become more and more difficult for Al Qaeda’s dwindling leadership to plan and execute 
the kinds of grand attacks that made it famous, the group has focused on radicalizing 
would-be terrorists who live in North America and Europe and have no formal ties to 
known organizations through this digital publication.33 
More recent literature depicts a different view of the threat posed by Islamic 
extremists to the U.S. homeland. In 2014, RAND National Defense Research Institute 
published “A Persistent Threat, The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists” by 
Seth G. Jones. This report examines the status and evolution of al Qa’ida and other 
Salafi-jihadist groups, a subject of intense debate in the West.34 Some argue that al 
Qa’ida, especially core al Qa’ida, has been severely weakened, and a major threat to the 
United States from Salafi-jihadist and other terrorist groups no longer exists. Former 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer Marc Sageman concludes, “al Qaeda is no 
longer seen as an existential threat to the West” and “the hysteria over a global 
conspiracy against the West has faded.”35 Brian Jenkins argues that few of America’s 
jihadists were dedicated or competent terrorists, and resembled “stray dogs” rather than 
“lone wolves.”36 According to Jenkins, of the 32 jihadists terrorist plots uncovered since 
9/11, most never moved beyond the discussion stage. Only 10 had what could be 
described as an operational plan, and of these, six were FBI stings. By comparison, the 
United States saw an average of 50 to 60 terrorist bombings a year in the 1970s and a 
greater number of fatalities. Some contend that the most acute threat to the United States 
32 James Bamford, “Inspire Magazine: The Most Dangerous Download on Earth,” GQ, December 
2013, http://www.gq.com/news-politics/newsmakers/201312/inspire-magazine-al-qaeda-boston-bombing. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Seth G. Jones, “A Persistent Threat, The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists,” RAND 





                                                 
comes from homegrown terrorists. Still others maintain that al Qa’ida is resilient and 
remains a serious threat to the United States.37 
Some of the concerns related to integrating CT by local LE are rooted in the 
disparity between terror incidents and traditional acts of violent crime, like murder. 
According to Charles Kurzman of the Department of Sociology, University of North 
Carolina, 16 Muslim-Americans were indicted for or killed during violent terrorist plots 
in 2013, similar to the 2012 total of 14, which brings the total since 9/11 to 225, or less 
than 20 per year. Meanwhile, the United States suffered approximately 14,000 murders in 
2013. Since 9/11, Muslim-American terrorism has claimed 37 lives in the United States, 
out of more than 190,000 murders during this period.38 
B. COUNTERTERRORISM AND POLICING 
The literature reviewed in this section provides evidence of an inconsistent and 
limited approach by local LE in the activity of CT. In written testimony for the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Michael O’Hanlon of the 
Brookings Institution stated, “No police forces in the country except New York’s have 
created more than skeletal counterterrorism units to integrate their normal police work with 
counterterrorism efforts.”39 This testimony reflects a disparity in local LE integration of 
CT, and reveals a need for individual local agencies to combine existing crime fighting 
efforts more effectively with CT.  
Further literature supporting a lack of CT engagement by local LE can be found in 
research conducted by David H. Bayley and David Weisburd in 2009, who studied the 
role of traditional policing in combating terrorism. Their research details the advantages 
and disadvantages of police engaging in a CT role; they surmise that despite 9/11, 
37 Jones, “A Persistent Threat, The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists.”  
38 Charles Kurzman, “Muslim-American Terrorism in 2013,” Department of Sociology, University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, February 5, 2014, http://kurzman.unc.edu/muslim-american-terrorism/. 
39 Michael E. O’Hanlon, “The Role of State and Local Governments in Homeland Security, Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,” Brookings, 2005, http://www.brookings. 
edu/research/testimony/2005/07/14homelandsecurity-ohanlon. 
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American police still seem to be searching for their role in CT.40 Their research revealed 
the following factors that influence a police agency’s participation in CT:41 
• Local Incidents of Terrorism: Since terrorist violence is frightening and 
traumatic, it requires a visible response from government, the police, and 
other emergency services. 
• The Structure of a Police Organization: The higher the governmental level 
at which police are organized, the more likely it is that preventive CT will 
be undertaken. An American study found that 75% of state LE agencies 
had specialized CT units versus only 15% at local levels. 
• The Size of the Police Unit: Specialization of function can only occur in 
organizations of scale.42 
This condition is further examined in Policing Terrorism, in which Max Waxman 
states, as to the issue of specialized expertise and local knowledge, a common mantra 
since 9/11 has been that local police are the “eyes and ears” or “front line” of the 
domestic war against terrorism. However, a dearth of systematic study of the 
effectiveness of state and local counter-terrorism programs remains.43  
An academic study conducted by Cynthia Lum, Maria (Maki) Haberfeld, George 
Fachner, and Charles Lieberman sought to answer the question, “What are police doing 
to counter terrorism?” The study concluded with one major lesson emerging. Despite the 
proliferation of and spending on police CT efforts, very little is known about the nature 
and effectiveness of police CT strategies.44 Their study examined three existing studies 
that surveyed multiple LE agencies about their CT activities to gain a general 
understanding of the tendencies of LE efforts.45 
40 Bayley and Weisburd, “Cops and Spooks: The Role of Police in Counterterrorism,” 95. 
41 Ibid., 88. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Matthew Waxman, “Policing Terrorism: Defining Ideas,” Hoover Institution Journal, May 4, 2012, 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/116471. 
44 Cynthia Lum et al., “Police Activities to Counter Terrorism: What We Know and What We Need to 
Know,” in To Protect and to Serve, ed. David Weisburd, Thomas Feucht, Idit Hakimi, Lois Mock, and 
Simon Perry (New York: Springer Science, 2011), chap. 5, 101. 
45 Ibid., 103. 
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The first one, The RAND Studies on State and Local Law Enforcement 
Preparedness, conducted a survey of local and state LE CT preparedness after 9/11, but 
prior to the creation of the DHS. RAND questioned hundreds of U.S. law LE agencies 
about their CT response to solicit information on resource allocation, threat perceptions, 
vulnerabilities, and preparedness activities.46 The RAND study revealed that 
“counterterrorism” in the United States often involves more long run and strategic 
planning activities that could be interpreted as somewhat general, ambiguous, and vague. 
Differences also exist in the capacity for, interest in, and engagement of these activities 
by state and local jurisdictions, which indicate how different types of jurisdictions view 
their CT roles and responsibilities in relation to the broader LE community.47 
A second source for understanding police responses to terrorism is a study 
conducted by The Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University 
(CSG/EKU). The aim of this study was to gauge how the terrorist attacks of 9/11 affected 
the operations and organization of LE agencies by probing agencies about their allocation 
of resources, interagency relationships, interactions with the private sector, and 
involvement in HS initiatives. Seventy-three statewide LE agencies in the United States 
(state police, highway patrol, and general investigative bureaus) were surveyed, as well 
as 400 local police and sheriff agencies.48 The study indicated that state agencies were 
more likely to reallocate resources for infrastructure security, special events, intelligence 
gathering and analysis, and terrorism-related investigations than local or smaller 
agencies.49 
The third existing source of knowledge about police CT responses is the most 
recently published Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Survey 
(LEMAS). It was given to a substantial sample of agencies in the United States, including 
all agencies with 100 or more sworn officers (denoted as “large”) and a representative 
46 Lum et al., “Police Activities to Counter Terrorism: What We Know and What We Need to Know,” 
104. 
47 Ibid., 105. 
48 Ibid., 106. 
49 Ibid. 
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sample of agencies with fewer than 100 officers (“small”).50 The study revealed that 
when agencies were asked about their use of personnel to address HS tasks (Figure 1), 
interestingly, a majority of agencies that participated in the LEMAS simply did not 
respond to this question (69%), which is reflected in the almost complete non-response 
(98%) of small agencies. Additionally, for those agencies that did respond, the vast 
majority indicated that they addressed the problem without creating or using a specialized 
unit. This response may indicate that even for larger U.S. agencies, CT is not prioritized 
over other functions that do require specialized resource allocation.51 
 
Figure 1.  LEMAS Survey  
This thesis does not submit to the idea of additional LE personnel to be tasked 
with CT as the LEMAS study depicts, but rather, a department-wide approach, so that all 
personnel are trained in how to detect, interdict, and report terrorist activity. In his book, 
Defending the Homeland, Jonathan R. White of Green Valley State University states that 
operational training should be focused on patrol and non-specialized investigations, and 
that patrol officers need to develop abilities to recognize potential terrorist situations 
during routine field contacts.52 
50 Lum et al., “Police Activities to Counter Terrorism: What We Know and What We Need to Know,” 
106. 
51 Ibid., 107. 
52 Jonathan R. White, Defending the Homeland. Domestic Intelligence, Law Enforcement and Security 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson, 2004), 64–68. 
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A review of the three studies reveals inconsistencies and significantly less 
involvement by local LE in CT, especially in smaller departments. Overall, these studies 
provide a foundation for gaining a sense of the tendencies of the American LE response. 
In particular, most police agencies in the United States do not appear to prioritize CT in 
their daily work and do not specifically dedicate large amounts of resources or personnel 
to such activities (strategic or tactical).53  
Literature supporting local efforts toward a role in CT can be found in the 
following two publications related to local engagement. An August 2011 White House 
report, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 
encourages local LE to utilize their existing relationships with members of the 
community to identify potential extremists and take action on the ground.54 The Building 
Communities of Trust (BCOT) initiative was published in 2012 by the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and is designed to help develop trusting 
relationships by bringing together local LE leaders, U.S. Attorney’s Offices, fusion 
centers, and community representatives to engage in open dialogue about how these 
groups can work together to help protect their communities against crime and terrorism.55 
These documents promote LE engagement at the “grass roots” level, and seek to leverage 
the strength of existing community networks to impact HS.  
The 2010 RAND report, The Long-Term Effects of Law Enforcement’s Post-9/11 
Focus on Counterterrorism and Homeland Security, addresses some of the issues related 
to locals participating in CT. The report revealed that LE agencies have found it more and 
more challenging to make the case, both internally and to local government, that 
investing in CT and HS is more important than having sworn officers dedicated to routine 
crime-fighting or other local priorities.56 Agencies that assigned personnel to a dedicated 
53 White, Defending the Homeland. Domestic Intelligence, Law Enforcement and Security, 108. 
54 White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2011). 
55 “Building Communities of Trust: A Guidance for Community Leaders,” April 25, 2012, 7, 
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/BCOTGuidanceForCommunityLeaders.pdf.  
56 Lois et al., “Long-term Effects of Law Enforcement’s Post-9/11 Focus on Counterterrorism and 
Homeland Security,” RAND Corporation, 70–71, 2010, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/mono 
graphs/2010/RAND_MG1031.pdf. 
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role in CT and HS in general must compete with other priorities within a department, 
such as addressing gang crime or violent crime in a region.57  
Examples cited by interviewees of the RAND study cited the following issues 
related to dedicated CT personnel. A department started a terrorism liaison officer 
program, which required an existing patrol officer position taking from each station to 
create the new program. However, as noted by an interviewee of that department, from 
the station captain’s perspective, “What does the terrorism liaison officer do for me? It 
means I’ve lost an officer in a radio car to this position.” Another interviewee in charge 
of a CT unit similarly noted, “I’ve heard senior leadership say they don’t know what CT 
does, what it accomplishes, how it helps them.” In their view, it does not help leadership 
make the case to local officials about what the department is doing to combat gang crime, 
for example, or other high-priority types of crime.58  
Like most cops, combating terrorism is not one of the daily concerns and 
understandably so, states Matt Ernst in a 2014, PoliceOne.com article.59 He finds many 
cops feel that they think only cities like New York City and Los Angeles have to worry 
about terrorists:60 “While our high-profile cities will always be the popular targets, we 
need to recognize that terrorists are living all over the U.S. and they can be plotting an 
attack against a target even while living several states away. Terrorists are mobile and 
travel the nation’s highways in order to recruit, raise funds, purchase resources, conduct 
surveillance, and ultimately carryout an attack.”61 LE officers need to focus their training 
not only on responding to an attack, but also on learning the non-criminal indicators of 
terrorism. LE is much more likely to encounter these indicators on traffic stops or while 
handling those everyday calls.62 
57 Lois et al., “Long-term Effects of Law Enforcement’s Post-9/11 Focus on Counterterrorism and 
Homeland Security,” 70–71, 
58 Ibid. 







                                                 
In 2010, the FBI confirmed that 4,876 alleged terrorists had contacts with U.S. 
LE, usually for reasons not related to terrorism. It has also been estimated that 20,000–
30,000 known terrorists on the Terrorist Watch List are in the United States at any given 
time. Based on Ernst’s research, 36 U.S. states either have been the intended target of a 
terrorist plot, or have been the location at which terrorists have been arrested, lived, or 
attended college.63  
The literature reveals that the integration of CT into the traditional LE mission is 
not a consistently applied or an accepted practice. At this point, the component of 
leadership becomes an integral part of a LE transformation. Leadership must serve as the 
catalyst to effect change and make CT relevant in the local LE environment.  
C. LEADERSHIP 
Former IACP president Bart Johnson points out that police must have a better 
understanding that CT is part of their responsibility in preventing and mitigating crime, 
and that some people try to separate terrorism from LE activity, but terrorism is a 
crime.64  
Leadership in its simplest form is essentially an individual’s ability to influence 
others, and with respect to the integration of a relatively new practice (counterterrorism) 
into an existing one (traditional policing), leadership is an integral part of the process. 
Arlington, Texas, Deputy Police Chief Fred Collie writes in his 2006 Naval Postgraduate 
School thesis, “Leaders in law enforcement organizations can provide leadership in the 
homeland security realm by appropriately and skillfully influencing their members, that 
they must provide purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to prevent terrorist 
attacks in their respective communities.”65 He argues that local LE has an important role 
to play in HS, although to fulfill that role effectively, it must be institutionalized in 
concepts, principles, and practices. Collie’s research reveals that the concept of the 
63 Ernst, “How Local and State Cops Fit in Counterterrorism.” 
64 Rita Boland, “Police Deliver Ground-Level Defense Against Terrorists,” SIGNAL Magazine Online, 
February 2012, http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/2874. 
65 Fred D. Collie, “21st Century Policing—The Institutionalization of Homeland Security in Local 
Law Enforcement Organizations” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 38.  
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institutionalization of HS and local LE is in its infancy and has not been a widely 
accepted practice as of 2006.  
Engagement in CT by locals is not mandated or directly funded by another level 
of government; therefore, it is reliant upon the prioritization level of individual 
departments. Numerous government publications have been created to stimulate local 
interaction in CT, which is the intent of the 2008 U.S. DOJ’s, Policing Terrorism: An 
Executive’s Guide. This guide is designed to help police executives meet the new 
challenges involved in countering the threat of terrorism by summarizing writings on the 
essential components of a CT plan.66 This comprehensive guide provides an excellent 
starting point for local LE integration of CT, but falls short in specifically addressing the 
importance of leadership toward a local role in CT, as engagement must start from the top 
for it to be taken seriously and foster department-wide implementation.  
The importance of local LE leadership in CT as an integral component of an 
agency’s CT plan cannot be underestimated, as the decision to engage on some level in 
the first place is essential. In the effective protection of an individual’s locality, police 
executive leadership must take the threat of terrorism seriously, because ultimately, an 
agency’s decision to engage in CT must be accepted, supported and implemented by 
personnel at every level of an organization.  
D. EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
In the evaluation of the integration of CT into the policing mission, a key area to 
assess is training and education of the topic. Local LE engagement in CT would require a 
slight modification of mindset and mission, as CT falls outside of the traditional policing 
model. The significance of education and training related to this topic is discussed further 
in the following literature.  
The foundation of an officer’s knowledge, skill, and ability on terrorism is rooted 
in training, a point reiterated by Chief Deputy Jose Docobo, who writes about the 
66 Graeme R. Newman and Ronald V. Clarke, Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide 
(Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice, Center for 
Problem Oriented Policing, 2008), 10, http://www.popcenter.org/library/reading/pdfs/PolicingTerrorism. 
pdf. 
 21 
                                                 
importance of training in the transformation of locals toward HS in the Homeland 
Security Affairs article, “Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for 
Homeland Security at the Local Law Enforcement Level.”67  
A recommendation of a 2010 study conducted by the Institute for Homeland 
Security, Solutions Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting 
U.S. Terrorist Plots, discusses the importance and opportunity for LE to contribute in 
terrorist detection. The report states,  
We must ensure processes and training are in place that enable law 
enforcement personnel to identify terrorist activity during routine criminal 
investigations. Nearly one in five thwarted plots were foiled ‘accidentally’ 
as a result of investigations into seemingly unrelated crimes. Law 
enforcement personnel need proper training and the necessary checks and 
balances within their agencies to ensure that they identify and follow-up 
on situations where an investigation of an ordinary crime may be 
potentially terrorism-related.68 
In an assessment of the topic of terrorism as a core competency for local LE, the 
primary focus of research conducted by Lieutenant LD Maples’ 2008 Naval Postgraduate 
School thesis, “Terrorism 101—Knowledge About the “What and Why” of Terrorism as 
a State and Local Law Enforcement Competency” was to assess the current state of 
terrorism training for state and local LE officials. His thesis looked at whether the subject 
of terrorism is a core professional competency for LE officials in every state and 
conducted a qualitative analysis to assess course content at the basic training level.69 He 
concluded that terrorism-related courses and training are not a required LE certification 
standard or competency in every state; his research points to a gap in terrorism training at 
the academy level for at least 40% of states.70 This percentage represents a substantial 
67 Docobo, “Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at the 
Local Law Enforcement Level.”  
68 Strom et al., “Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist 
Plots, 1999–2009,” 19. 
69 LD M. Maples, “Terrorism 101—Knowledge about the “What and Why” of Terrorism as a State 
and Local Law Enforcement Competency” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), V. 
70 Ibid., 40. 
 22 
                                                 
hole in the training of LE. This thesis seeks to develop a model to close or reduce this gap 
of training on the topic of terrorism.  
An idea proposed of how to address training for all local LE is the establishment 
of a standardized terrorism-training curriculum, which was a key recommendation of 
Colonel Blair Alexander’s 2005 United States Army War College thesis, “Strategies to 
Integrate America’s Local Police into Domestic Counterterrorism.” He asserts that a CT 
training curriculum should be standardized for local agencies at both the recruit and in-
service levels through the close coordination of key LE training agencies.71 Brett M. 
Ringo also sought to standardize these subjects throughout the LE community in the 
conclusion of his March 2013 Naval Postgraduate thesis, “Domestic Terrorism: Fighting 
the Local Threat with Local Law Enforcement,” Ringo states that police departments 
around the country need to develop a universal syllabus that provides efficient and 
effective instruction on CT to police officers.72 
In an effort to integrate this subject matter into the DNA of an organization, the 
incorporation of this topic at the basic and in-service levels of LE training seemingly 
makes practical sense, as it provides not only a starting point, but also a continual 
platform to teach the tactics, techniques, and threats related to terrorism as they evolve.  
Another important element of CT integration and training is related to the 
effective application of information sharing within the LE environment. This element can 
be accomplished through individual agency interactions with their state and regional 
fusion centers that provide an outlet to share information directly gathered by locals in 
the form of SAR. Such reports are supported by standardized guidelines and reporting 
procedures, which can be facilitated through the National SAR Initiative (NSI), who 
provide training opportunities to enhance LE information sharing, facilitate interaction, 
and ensure standardized collection and reporting. Fusion centers often play a significant 
role in facilitating and coordinating this training. Between August 1, 2012 and July 31, 
71 Blair C. Alexander, “Strategies to Integrate America’s Local Police Agencies into Domestic 
Counterterrorism” (USAWC strategy research project, United States Army War College, 2005), 6. 
72 Brett M. Ringo, “Domestic Terrorism: Fighting the Local Threat with Local Enforcement” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 64. 
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2013, 193,451 individuals, including 123,144 frontline police, fire, emergency 
management, and EMS officers, received SAR training through the NSI’s two training 
programs.73 
Local officers need to be trained properly and consistently in the area of terrorism 
to be able to apply CT continually into their policing mindset. Once educated and trained 
on the topic, in concert with knowing how to report it effectively, locals are primed to 
engage in gathering information that may be related to protecting their communities from 
an act of terrorism.  
E. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
An examination of the integration of policing and CT includes an assessment of 
intelligence gathering by police, who routinely gather criminal intelligence during the 
course of their traditional policing duties. The following literature outlines the issues 
related to local LE intelligence gathering efforts. In 2008, the Los Angeles Times reported 
that since 9/11, authorities have urged local police to become the front line in domestic 
CT, and to gather street-level intelligence about crimes and suspicious activities that 
could foretell another attack. However, for various reasons, it has not worked out that 
way. The nation’s local LE agencies have gathered information in their own haphazard 
ways or not at all, experts say.74  
A 2010 Institute for Homeland Security Solutions report, “Building on Clues: 
Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999–2009,” states,  
what is particularly problematic has been the lack of coordination and 
standardization of counterterrorism practices at the state and local levels. 
For example, in the absence of federal guidance, local jurisdictions have 
developed different procedures for collecting and prioritizing suspicious 
activity reports (SARs)—reports of activities and behaviors potentially 
related to terrorism collected from incident reports, field interviews, 911 
73 “2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report,” June 2014, 29, https://www.chds. 
us/?pr&id=3171.  
74 Josh Meyer, “LAPD Leads the Way in Local Counter-Terrorism. A Commander’s Checklist Is a 
Link from Traditional Police Work to Collecting Data to Combat Terror Attacks,” Los Angeles Times, 
April 14, 2008.  
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calls, and tips from the public. This lack of standardization has impeded 
the sharing and analysis of such information.75  
The following study and subsequent thesis provide details of a local LE 
intelligence effort that falls short and is in need of improvement. A look at the 
capabilities of local police intelligence gathering was conducted in 2011 by researchers at 
the Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) at George Washington University. They 
collected survey data of police intelligence commanders for the 56 largest cities in the 
United States. Their survey revealed a consensus that the United States lacks an adequate 
understanding of the intelligence enterprise as it relates to CT. As a result, police 
intelligence capabilities are lacking, collection is haphazard, resources are underutilized, 
and agencies have a limited ability to develop anticipatory knowledge concerning future 
attacks, mitigate risks, or respond to emerging threats.76  
In Michael Andreas’ analysis of the intelligence function of local police 
departments, he found that the majority of police departments do not have assigned 
terrorism liaison officers (TLOs), and the intelligence situation is much worse. He states 
that, “there is no one inside most municipal police departments who is specifically trained 
to investigate suspicious and terrorism-related incidents. No one is proactively scouring 
police reports, public documents, or the community for information that could be utilized 
in the war on terror.”77  
Local LE does have access to publications designed to assist local LE policy 
makers in enhancing their intelligence gathering efforts. The U.S. DOJ, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for 
State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies is the most recent intelligence 
publication and comprehensive manual to assist local agencies in this endeavor. It is 
75 Strom et al., “Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist 
Plots, 1999–2009,” 2. 
76 Frank J. Cilluffo, Joseph R. Clark, and Michael P. Downing, “Counterterrorism Intelligence: Law 
Enforcement Perspectives, Counterterrorism Intelligence Survey Research,” The George Washington 
University Homeland Security Policy Institute, September 2011, 1, https://www.llis.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/counterIntelligence.pdf. 
77 Andreas, “How Should Municipal Police Agencies Participate in America’s Homeland Security 
Strategy,” 63. 
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authored by David L. Carter, Ph.D. and directed primarily toward state, local, and tribal 
LE agencies of all sizes that need to develop or reinvigorate their intelligence function. 
Rather than being a manual to teach a person how to be an intelligence analyst, it is 
directed toward that manager, supervisor, or officer assigned to create an intelligence 
function. It is intended to provide ideas, definitions, concepts, policies, and resources.78  
By and large, local LE does not have the capacity to undertake intelligence 
gathering focusing on terrorism, nor could it analyze the information that might be 
collected. Most intelligence about terrorism comes from federal sources, apart from a few 
large cities like New York and Los Angeles.79 The ability to gather intelligence locally is 
a key strength of LE engagement in CT, as “raw” information can be gathered from the 
“street,” compiled into a SAR, forwarded to a fusion center, and potentially, developed 
into an active FBI investigation that subsequently links all three levels of government in 
the HS network. 
F. CONCLUSION 
In the 13 years since 9/11, the United States has had limited occurrences of 
terrorist activity within its borders. The threat of terrorism remains, and in light of actual 
incidences of terrorism, the local level of government cannot ignore the possibility that an 
attack could occur. The importance of LE and the general public in preventing attacks 
must be recognized, and supported through investments in education and reporting. 
Between 1999–2009, more than four in five foiled U.S. terrorist plots were discovered via 
observations from LE and the general public.80 
Numerous Naval Postgraduate School theses discussed in this literature review 
have addressed the issue of improved local LE and HS or CT integration, but a dearth of 
engagement still exists. The literature suggests that this issue can be partly attributed at 
the local level, especially in smaller agencies, to no incidences (perceived threat of 
78 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies, iii. 
79 Bayley and Weisburd, “Cops and Spooks: The Role of Police in Counterterrorism,” 87. 
80 Strom et al., “Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist 
Plots 1999–2009,” 18–19. 
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attack), prioritization, confusion, apathy, resistance, and competition with traditional 
crime. 
However, clearly, the opportunity exists for local LE leadership to incorporate CT 
better into their traditional policing mission. Based upon the present condition and a 
review of the literature, this thesis asserts that the catalyst for integration is rooted in the 
following topical areas that are discussed in greater detail in the coming chapters: 
leadership, training and education, and intelligence gathering related to terrorism.  
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III. COUNTERTERRORISM AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is organized into three sections that progress from an assessment of 
the threat posed by terrorists to the U.S. homeland, into a description of the primary 
entities at the state and federal level that play a role in domestic CT. The final segment of 
this chapter focuses on the post-9/11 LE mission, and highlights the strengths and 
benefits of CP and local engagement in a CT role. It concludes with a review of the CT 
strategies of two international LE agencies for smart practices and the identification of 
issues for consideration related to a U.S. local LE strategy that employs CT.  
B. THE THREAT 
In the 21st century, technology has connected the political, social, and economic 
environment of this nation’s ever-changing world more closely than in any other time in 
history and sets the stage for unprecedented global collaboration and the potential for 
both prosperity and conflict. For those who seek to influence United States policy and 
strategy through fear, whether they are foreign or domestic entities, terrorism offers a 
means to do so. Hoffman defines terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of 
fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”81 This 
definition would logically imply that the potential for acts of terror on U.S. soil would 
perpetually be a future threat to this country’s citizenry.  
In Spring 2014, the 12th and most recent issue of Inspire magazine was released 
by AQAP. This issue devotes a lengthy section to what AQAP calls “Open Source 
Jihad,” and seeks to motivate and educate aspiring lone wolf jihadists who do not have 
the ability to receive more formal training.82 A “lone wolf” is defined as, a person who 
acts individually without orders from or even connections to an organization. The theory 
81 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism,” 40. 
82 Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Releases 12th Issue of Inspire Magazine,” 
The Long War Journal, March 17, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/03/al_qaeda_ 
in_the_arab.php.  
 29 
                                                 
is that this distance will prevent the disclosure of attack planning to informants or 
technical surveillance, and therefore, provide superior operational security.83 
The latest publication of Inspire clearly puts the United States in the crosshairs for 
would-be attackers. The author states that America “is our first target” and advises 
jihadists that they should target places “flooded with individuals, e.g. sports events in 
which tens of thousands attend, election campaigns, festivals and other gatherings. The 
important thing is that you target people and not buildings.”84  
The threat of terrorism does exist within U.S. borders, and underlines the 
importance of local LE engagement in CT. It is important to recognize that a core 
function of LE is the protection of their citizenry from violent offenders, and would 
seemingly also include terrorists.  
C. DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM  
1. Introduction 
Two primary entities interact with local LE in the area of terrorism and 
information sharing: state and major urban area fusion centers and the FBI Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces (FBI-JTTFs), which serve distinct but complementary roles in 
securing the homeland.  
Fusion centers are owned and operated by state and local entities and are uniquely 
situated to empower front-line LE, public safety, fire service, emergency response, public 
health, and private sector security personnel to gather and share threat-related information 
lawfully. The FBI created, coordinates, and manages JTTFs, which primarily focus on 
terrorism-related investigations. Both rely on expertise and information derived from all 
levels of government to support their efforts.85 
83 Burton and Stewart, The “Lone Wolf” Disconnect.  
84 Ibid. 
85 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-
joint-terrorism-task-forces. 
 30 
                                                 
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation—Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
The FBI is the lead federal LE agency charged with CT investigations. Since the 
9/11 attacks, the FBI has implemented a series of reforms intended to transform itself 
from a largely reactive LE agency focused on investigations of criminal activity into a 
more proactive, agile, flexible, and intelligence-driven agency that can prevent acts of 
terrorism.86  
According to the FBI, JTTFs are the nation’s front-line on terrorism and are based 
in 103 cities nationwide. JTTFs provide one-stop shopping for information regarding 
terrorist activities; and are comprised of local, state, and federal LE.87  
3. State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 
The ability to share information effectively within the LE environment is a 
challenging endeavor, as fusion centers are the localized entities created to assist all three 
levels of government with LE sharing. Today, fusion centers serve as primary focal 
points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and 
sharing of threat-related information among federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial 
(SLATT) partners.88 During the 2010 National Fusion Center Conference, the federal 
government and fusion center leaders distilled the baseline capabilities for state and 
major urban area fusion centers into four critical operational capabilities (COCs), as 
shown in Figure 2.89 
86 Jerome P. Bjelopera, The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations (CRS 
Report No. R41780) (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2013), 2, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf. 
87 “Protecting America from Terrorist Attack, Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” accessed August 19, 
2013, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs.  
88 “National Network of Fusion Centers Fact Sheet,” accessed April 18, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/ 
national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet.  
89 Bart R. Johnson, “Fusion Centers: Strengthening the Nation’s Homeland Security Enterprise,” The 
Police Chief, 78, 62–68, February 2011, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuse 
action=display&article_id=2315&issue_id=22011.  
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Figure 2.  Fusion Center Operational Capabilities  
Fusion centers have proven to be an effective and valuable resource in the realm 
of LE information sharing, as demonstrated by statistics found in the 2013 National 
Network of Fusion Centers Final Report. In the 2012 assessment period, fusion centers 
submitted a total of 3,500 SARs to the FBI. Of the 5,883 SARs submitted in 2013, 193, 
or 3.3% of the total, resulted in the initiation or enhancement of an FBI investigation, 
including JTTF investigations. In 2012, 88 SARs submitted by fusion centers resulted in 
the initiation or enhancement of an FBI investigation.90 




                                                 
D. POLICING POST 9/11: THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSION 
Homeland security begins with hometown security, and our efforts to 
confront threats in our communities are most effective when they are led 
by local law enforcement and involve strong collaboration with the 
communities and citizens they serve.91 
—Former Department of Homeland Security 
Secretary Janet Napolitano (2010) 
1. Introduction  
Local LE are the subject matter experts (SMEs) of their locality and have superior 
knowledge of the people and places that comprise their jurisdiction. Terrorist attacks may 
be transnational in origin or homegrown, but wherever they come from, much of their 
activity occurs in locations in which the most significant governmental presence is the 
local police.92  
Local LE along with local citizenry are well positioned to be the “eyes and ears” 
of local HS efforts. Through the formation of these partnerships, it is believed that LE 
will satisfy HS responsibilities by encouraging citizen participation, which can exhibit 
informal social control and surveillance in the prevention and detection of terrorist 
attacks.93  
2. Community Oriented Policing 
CP is a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which support the 
systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to address proactively the 
immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues, such as crime, social disorder, 
91 “Secretary Napolitano Announces New Community-Based Law Enforcement Initiatives in 
Conjunction with National Night Out,” August 3, 2010, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2010/08/03/secretary-
napolitano-announces-new-community-based-law-enforcement-initiatives.  
92 Peter Grabosky, “Community Policing in an Age of Terrorism,” Crime, Law & Social Change 50, 
no. 1/2 (June 2008): 2, Dudley Knox Library, EBSCOhost (33126549). 
93 Robert R. Friedmann and William J. Cannon, “Homeland Security and Community Policing: 
Competing or Complementing Public Safety Policies,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management 4, no. 4, art. 2, 7, 2007, http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000& 
context=cj_facpub. 
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and fear of crime.94 These partnerships, which are based on trust and mutual respect, 
consequently provide a platform for information gathering between police and 
community members.  
Efforts to counter AQ-linked or influenced terrorism are increasingly drawing 
upon community-based initiatives based upon engagement and partnership work between 
police officers and members of Muslim communities, in the United Kingdom (UK), in 
some parts of northern Europe, and North America. Communities are being seen as key 
partners in countering the threat and community-policing models are increasingly being 
drawn upon, and utilized, to work toward countering AQ terrorism-related crime.95  
In “Homeland Security and Community Policing: Competing or Complementing 
Public Safety Policies,” R. Friedmann and W. Cannon argue that a successful HS 
policing strategy must be built on a community policing philosophy. Based upon their 
similar strategies, which both promote partnerships between public and private agencies, 
as well as between police and citizens, they are proactive and advocate information 
gathering, data analysis, community partnerships, collaboration, and crime prevention.96  
In the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombings, former Boston Police 
Commissioner Ed Davis cautioned that local police departments must rely on their local 
communities to provide information on malefactors rather than depending exclusively on 
information in databases.97 Davis states, “There is no technical means we can point to; 
there is no computer that is going to spit out a terrorist’s name. It’s the community being 
94 U. S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Community Policing 
Defined, 3. 
95 Basia Spalek, “Community Policing, Trust and Muslim Communities in Relation to New 
Terrorism,” Politics & Policy 38, no. 4 (August 25, 2010): 789, Wiley Online Library, DOI: 10.1111/j. 
1747-1346.2010.00258.x. 
96 Allison T. Chappell and Sarah A. Gibson, “Community Policing and Homeland Security Policing: 




                                                 
involved in the conversation and being appropriately open to communicating with law 
enforcement when something is awry and identified.”98  
3. Benefits of Local Engagement 
Most Americans can relate to having some contact with a local LE officer. It has 
been estimated that one out of five Americans 16-years of age and older have one face-
to-face contact with police each year. This number amounts to almost 44 million 
contacts, of which 20 million occur in traffic stops. 99 This number, therefore, amounts to 
a huge opportunity for local LE to detect, identify, or arrest an individual engaged in 
direct or ancillary terrorist activity.  
Examples of the opportunity for local contact are exemplified in two incidents 
related to the 9/11 hijackers 
Mohammad Atta was given a ticket by Broward County, Florida, sheriff’s 
deputies for driving without a license four months before the attack on the 
World Trade Towers. Because he skipped his court appearance, a warrant 
was issued for his arrest. Two days before 9/11, a Maryland State Trooper 
stopped Ziad S. Jarra, who was on a CIA ‘watch’ list, for speeding in 
Pikesville, Maryland. Although hindsight is always wiser than foresight, 
these examples show the remarkable extent of routine contact that police 
have with criminals, including potential terrorists.100 
History is strewn with incidents of LE contact with high profile targets on U.S. 
soil during the performance of their duties. Timothy McVeigh, for example, was arrested 
and subsequently tried for the Oklahoma City bombing after being stopped by an 
Oklahoma State Trooper for having an invalid license plate.101 In 2010, in Times Square, 
a vendor on the sidewalk saw smoke coming out of vents near the back seat of a vehicle 
98 Mickey McCarter, “A Failure to Connect the Dots,” HomelandSecurityToday.us, May 10, 2013, 
http://www.hstoday.us/focused-topics/customs-immigration/single-article-page/a-failure-to-connect-the-
dots-in-boston/d42d4cab18b111ca9eced3b592616e6f.html. 
99 Bayley and Weisburd, “Cops and Spooks: The Role of the Police in Counterterrorism,” 91.  
100 Bayley and Weisburd, “Cops and Spooks: The Role of the Police in Counterterrorism,” 91. 
101 Ibid.  
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parked awkwardly at the curb with its engine running and its hazard lights on. The vendor 
called to a mounted police officer and a bomb was discovered in the vehicle.102  
In the prevention or mitigation of an attack, the opportunity to have contact with a 
terrorist and the utilization of informal ties with the community to solicit information 
provides two significant benefits of integrating CT into the local LE mission. The ability 
of local LE to refine and enhance constantly the who, what, where, when, and how of 
their individual jurisdiction, is an advantage that a state or federal LE entity cannot come 
close to replicating.  
4. Victoria, Australia 
In the search for a smart practice related to local LE and CT engagement, 
Australian efforts offer some worthwhile examples. Pickering, McCulloch, and Wright-
Neville state in Counter-terrorism Policing: Community, Cohesion and Security that the 
Victoria Police are the best example for community CT policing worldwide and are a 
case study for illustrating continuities and dissonance between those undertaking daily 
community policing functions, and their approach to community and CT.103 This 
approach is based upon their social cohesion community policing model, which ensures 
that laws are applied in ways that enhance social cohesion, safety, and the rights of 
citizens. They work to strengthen the dialogue between minority groups in the 
community and police. This dialogue is instrumental in reducing fear and anxiety, and 
promoting trust and information sharing.104 Three components of the Victoria Police CT 
and policing strategy have merit for U.S. local LE integration. 
a. Organization-Wide Responsibility 
While CT has traditionally been seen as the responsibility of a few specialist areas 
of Victoria Police, they now seek to raise the level of CT awareness among all members; 
102 Al Baker and William K. Rashbaum, “Police Find Bomb in Times Square,” NYTimes.com, May 1, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/nyregion/02timessquare.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
103 Ming Li Hsieh, “A Seminar Discussion on Contemporary Counter-Terrorism Policing,” Academy 




                                                 
everyone must recognize that they have a critical role in the broader counter terrorism 
effort. In particular, frontline police can assist in the collection of intelligence, as well as 
build relationships with communities to help reduce the appeal of ideologies central to 
the spread of violent extremism.105 
b. Partnership Driven 
Victoria Police understand that the community is a crucial element in all aspects 
of CT, from the reporting of suspicious behavior on the one hand, to supporting 
individuals who might be at risk of being recruited into terrorism on the other. Their 
relationship with community groups is based on trust and a long history of engagement 
around an equally diverse range of issues and concerns.106 
c. Respect for Law and Human Dignity 
Their approach to CT is grounded in a set of core organizational values, including 
a commitment to treating all people with respect and dignity. In undertaking CT 
activities, they do not target specific religious or ethnic groups, in the understanding that 
individuals who support or engage in terrorist behavior are not representative of the 
larger communities from which they emerge.107 
5. The United Kingdom 
In response to terrorism, the government of the UK has taken the threat seriously 
and has made significant progress in minimizing their risk.108 The police in the UK focus 
on creating a hostile environment for terrorists to operate within, by embracing a dual 
strategy of effectively targeting crimes and behaviors associated with terrorist activities 
105 Victoria Police, Victoria Police Counter Terrorism Framework, Guiding Principles (Victoria, 
Australia, Victoria Police, 2013), 3. 
106 Victoria Police, Victoria Police Counter Terrorism Framework, Guiding Principles, 3. 
107 Ibid. 
108 HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (United 
Kingdom: HM Government, July 2011), 3.  
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and developing a public communications strategy that can make the public an effective 
partner in CT intelligence gathering.109  
In 2006, the UK developed a comprehensive national strategy for countering 
terrorism, known as CONTEST (Counter Terrorism Strategy) and its aim is to reduce the 
risk to the UK from terrorism.110 CONTEST is organized around four work streams. 
• Prevent—To stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism; an 
effort by the government to curb radicalization and reach out to those who 
based on socio-economic, geo-political, cultural, or religious disposition, 
may be at a high risk for involvement in an act of terrorism.111 
• Protect—To reduce the vulnerability of their critical national 
infrastructure crowded places, the transport system, and borders.112 In the 
UK, counter terrorism security advisors are in every police force and their 
core role is to identify and assess local critical sites within that might be 
vulnerable to terrorist attack.113 
• Prepare—To mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack, by improving 
resiliency, mitigating consequences, and responding to attacks.114 In the 
UK, their Security Service (MI5) provides formal CT training to all rank 
levels of police; as well as specialized training for CT operations.115 
• Pursue—To stop terrorist attacks;116 the UK applies a nationalized effort 
toward the pursuit of terrorists.117 
109 Paul Howard, “Hard Won Lessons: How Police Fight Terrorism in the United Kingdom,” 
ManhattanInstitute.org, December 2004, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/scr_01.pdf. 
110 Ibid. 
111 HM Government, Pursue, Prevent, Protect Prepare, The United Kingdom’s Strategy for 
Countering International Terrorism Annual Report (United Kingdom: HM Government, March 2010). 
112 Ibid. 
113 National Counter Terrorism Security Office, “Our Services,” accessed April 14, 2014, http://www. 
nactso.gov.uk/our-services. 
114 Paul Jonathan Smith, Counterterrorism in the United Kingdom, Module II: Policy Response 
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, 2014). 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid., 6. 
117 Paul Jonathan Smith, Counterterrorism in the United Kingdom, Module III:The UK’s 
Counterterrorism Structure and the Pursuit of Terrorists (Monterey, CA: Center for Homeland Defense 
and Security, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014). 
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6. Issues for Consideration—Community Relations 
In the implementation of a local CT strategy, agencies must consider their 
existing community relations. How a local CT strategy is implemented is important; an 
aggressive or the perception of a heavy-handed approach could lead to community 
alienation and mistrust, which may damage all facets of police and community relations.  
David Thacher, a University of Michigan professor of public policy and urban 
planning, states that when the local police get too involved in HS, which emphasizes 
surveillance, identification, and the investigation of particular people suspected of 
terrorism, it is often done at the expense of community policing.118 In particular, people 
who share ethnic, religious, and immigrant resemblance with individuals involved in 
terrorist organizations may feel threatened by enhanced police surveillance.119 
Traditional crime is certainly more prevalent in U.S. neighborhoods. A CT strategy could 
be perceived as an over-reach by police, as in the unnecessary profiling of persons based 
upon limited actual incidences.  
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter outlined a clear and existential threat of terrorism within the U.S. 
homeland, and underscored the importance of local LE and CT in the protection of their 
citizenry. A description of the two primary entities with a role in domestic CT at the state 
and federal level, fusion centers and FBI-JTTFs, followed. The post-9/11 paradigm shift 
in policing was discussed, which specifically outlined how the CP model can be 
leveraged toward local engagement of CT and the strengths of local LE through their 
numbers, proximity, and traditional duties beneficial in CT. A look at international LE 
CT efforts revealed smart practices with merit for U.S. local LE implementation. Finally, 
this chapter presented issues for consideration that may have an adverse impact on a local 
LE CT strategy.  
118 Page, “Community Policing or Homeland Security: A ‘Sophie’s Choice’ for Police?,” 20. 
119 Friedmann and Cannon, “Homeland Security and Community Policing: Competing or 
Complementing Public Safety Policies,” 8. 
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This thesis asserts that the ability of local LE to contribute in a CT role can be 
positively impacted by the topical areas of Chapters IV–VI, which address their influence 
on the integration of local LE and CT. These chapters are listed in progressive order of 
their importance toward influencing the integration of CT into the DNA of local policing, 




In the context of this thesis, “leadership” stands as the topical level with the 
greatest potential to impact local LE engagement in CT. The application of this activity 
into the policing continuum is dependent upon acceptance by the leaders of an 
organization. “Leadership is critical to forming and implementing strategy and without it, 
good strategy does not happen.”120 This concept ultimately contributes to the increased 
opportunity for it to become part of an agency’s DNA.  
In general, local LE is already demonstrating that they are competent and 
proficient in the performance of their traditional duties. By applying CT as a positive 
layer in something locals already do well, it may add value to the organization and 
community stakeholders, and consequently, challenge the status quo with a new approach 
to enhance overall public safety.  
LE has experienced many paradigm shifts throughout its existence, from a 
decentralized structure to centralized, from one of rigid hierarchy to one promoting 
greater autonomy within the ranks, from one distant from the community to one actively 
engaged with it that address shared concerns and develop interested community 
stakeholders.121 If state and local authorities are now to become equal partners in 
combating the emergent threat of domestic terror and homegrown extremism, it is 
necessary that a culture of awareness and responsibility be fully developed within the LE 
enterprise, which can only be achieved through inspired leadership.122 
Leadership related to terrorism starts with local ownership of the problem, not a 
deferral to the federal government or a hope that the likelihood of an act of terrorism is so 
120 James N. Fuller and Jack C. Green, “The Leader’s Role in Strategy,” Graziado Business Review 8, 
no. 2 (2005), http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/2010/08/the-leaders-role-in-strategy/. 
121 Matt A. Mayer and Scott G. Erickson, “Changing Today’s Law Enforcement Culture to Face 21st-




                                                 
remote it is not worth understanding or acknowledging. The transformation of an 
agency’s organizational culture begins and ends with its leaders.  
B. LOCAL OWNERSHIP 
Local LE takes the lead on all traditional criminal threats affecting their 
jurisdiction, but in the pursuit of terrorists and extremists, the effort put forth has not 
risen to the same level as conventional criminal pursuit. Issues attributable to this 
condition are addressed in Section D of this chapter. Locals have the opportunity to apply 
their traditional strengths in a CT role in support of national HS efforts.  
Aside from their numerical advantage, local police are often better suited to 
perform CT functions because of their superior familiarity with their local 
communities.123 Federal LE officials are tasked with investigating specific federal 
crimes, while local police functions include preventing and investigating crime, as well as 
maintaining order, patrolling, and providing services. As a result of these wider 
mandates, local police are positioned naturally to collect and process information about 
communities and activities within them.124 All these elements place local LE in a 
position to contribute greatly in a CT role by having pre-incident contact, as was outlined 
in Chapter III. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
The task of a wholesale re-engineering of American local LE toward a CT role is 
complex and unprecedented. If U.S. LE is to move forward to a national role in HS, then 
practical, focused, and effective training must be a cornerstone of this transformation. 
Without appropriate and ongoing training of both current and new LE personnel, HS is 
123 Marc Sageman, “A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists,” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618 Annals 223, July 2008, http://www.artisresearch. 
com/articles/Sageman_Strategy_for_Fighting.pdf. 
124 Mathew C. Waxman, “Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and 
Counterterrorism after 9/11,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy 3, no. 2 (2009): 377, http://jnslp. 
com/2010/02/15/police-and-national-security-american-local-law-enforcement-and-counterterrorism-after-
911/.    
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dismissed as a passing concept instead of a cultural change in LE strategy.125 This 
change cannot be accomplished without the vision and support of an agency head, the 
chief of police or sheriff, who must understand that HS starts at the local level; a more 
bottom-up than top-down strategy is required.  
To integrate HS, it must be adopted agency-wide to realize its full potential and 
effectiveness. Integrating the HS responsibility into the agency’s mission statement, 
goals, policies and procedures, training programs, and other systems and activities that 
define organizational culture, should reflect this adoption.126 CP took many years to be 
accepted, understood, and effectively integrated into the local LE mission, but is now the 
primary policing standard. The same effort can be applied to the integration of CT with 
the support of leaders who keep CT relevant.  
D. OBSTACLES OF INTEGRATION 
In the research of local LE and CT integration, numerous issues were revealed 
that are impacting the interaction of these two activities. This segment addresses these 
problems and examines issues partly attributable to them.  
For local LE, pressing police priorities are handling calls for service and 
protecting the public within their jurisdictions, all while trying to control crime.127 These 
priorities ultimately take precedence over terrorism prevention programs and potential 
terrorist threats. It becomes difficult for LE executives to justify dedicating resources to 
CT when most agencies are located in areas not perceived to be primary targets or to 
possess significant critical infrastructure. Countless LE leaders have articulated that they 
are just barely getting by with their personnel handling traditional crimes. Complacency 
is not the reason their agencies are not working to further CT efforts, they argue; it is the 
fact that it is just not practical or justifiable to make CT their top priority.128 
125 Docobo, “Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at the 
Local Law Enforcement Level.” 
126 Ibid. 




                                                 
According to Chief Walter McNeil, reasons and perceptions that impede an 
agency’s involvement in CT include perceptions that an agency is too small, that it is the 
responsibility of the federal government, and that most departments are simply trying to 
focus on day-to-day crime and do not have the resources to get involved in protection of 
the homeland.129 In addition, a major issue confronting police administrators is how to 
monitor police performance and its impact on crime.130 In many departments, this 
monitoring is accomplished with COMPSTAT, short for Compare Stats, a process by 
which crime is analyzed for police administrators to identify problem areas and respond 
accordingly.131 COMPSTAT does not track, analyze, or include any areas related to 
terrorism or HS, as it is focused on traditional Part I crimes, which guide the focus of an 
individual agency on a day-to-day basis. This cycle can create “tunnel vision” for police 
executives, who remain focused only on traditional crime reduction. Thus, in some cases, 
ancillary issues, such as terrorism prevention and detection, do not necessarily fit into the 
crime reduction equation and are viewed as unimportant. 
E. CONCLUSION 
According to Newman and Clarke in Policing Terrorism: An Executives Guide,  
You might feel that your town is too small and insignificant to attract the 
attention of terrorists.132 You might well be right, if only because there are 
many thousands of towns and cities in the United States and terrorist 
attacks are rare. Some experts, however, believe that it is this very 
insignificance that might attract terrorists because an attack on an 
unremarkable and unexpected target might generate more fear. Whether 
this is true or not, you cannot take risks with the lives of people in your 
community: you must make plans to prevent an attack and to respond 
quickly and efficiently if one occurs.133 
129 Walter A. McNeil, “Homeland Security Is Hometown Security,” President’s Message,” The Police 
Chief, 79 (February 2012): 6, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=dis 
play_arch&article_id=2593&issue_id=22012. 
130 Edward A. Thibault et al., Proactive Police Management (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2009), 
122.  
131 Ibid. 
132 Newman and Clarke, Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide. 
133 Ibid. 
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In the formative process of developing a strategy to integrate CT into the local LE 
mission, this thesis asserts that the next level to be addressed after leadership is the 
organizational education and training of the activity. The area of education and training 
provides the foundation to enhance a local department’s knowledge, skill and ability of 
the subject matter. Chapter IV lays the framework for how local LE can raise their IQ on 
the subject of terrorism and what educational and training opportunities are available for 
individual agencies to integrate this subject matter into their policing continuum.  
 45 
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V. TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Shifting to a LE culture with an indelible awareness of the domestic terror threat 
requires a tremendous commitment on the part of LE leaders and administrators.134 
However, a commitment in name constitutes only one aspect of the change process. The 
true manifestation of change begins with the training regime provided for nascent 
officers, as well as the value placed on its content. Early and consistent training provides 
the foundation and values that officers entering the workforce will incorporate into their 
daily activities.135  
A fundamental component in the implementation of a new idea, concept, or 
strategy is training and education. In local LE, the opportunity to indoctrinate an officer 
in the policies and practices of an agency begins at the basic level. This indoctrination 
generally occurs in the form of a police academy, which adheres to a combination of 
standardized, state-mandated requirements and training specifically developed for the 
needs of an individual agency. State and national accreditation standards may also be a 
factor in the training and educational curriculum of an agency. 
In the policing world, the opportunity to further train and educate is conducted on 
an annual or semi-annual basis, through the application of in-service or annual training. 
Many agencies are positioned to conduct training in a classroom, the field, via computer-
based program, or a combination of all three. The training requirements for this level 
parallel the basic level but in an abbreviated manner.  
A third component of training in local LE is specialized training, which may be 
based upon an officer’s assignment in the organization, for instance, Special Weapons 
and Tactics (SWAT), canine unit (K9), explosive ordinance disposal (EOD), or gang unit. 
Specialized training may also include department-wide training opportunities, for 
134 Mayer and Erickson, “Changing Today’s Law Enforcement Culture to Face 21st-Century Threats.” 
135 Ibid. 
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example, advanced patrol tactics, driving under the influence (DUI) enforcement, and 
undercover operations. 
Based upon the three aforementioned subcategories, this chapter provides a more 
in-depth analysis of each level. This research is directed at an attempt to identify the 
importance and relevance of each level as it relates to the integration of local LE and CT.  
B. BASIC LEVEL—RECRUIT 
The basic level is the first logical place to train and educate on the integration of 
CT into the DNA of American policing. It provides the opportunity for an agency to 
integrate terrorism into the initial education of a new LE officer. Gone are the days of a 
county sheriff handing his buddy a badge and gun and “deputizing” him to go out on the 
street and enforce laws in which this individual has never been trained. In today’s modern 
LE world, police training is as important as doctors attending medical school or lawyers 
passing the bar exam.136 Without properly trained police officers, society could not 
successfully function.137 
In Defending the Homeland, Jonathan R. White discusses the importance of 
embedding a CT element into the initial education of a police officer. He states that 
training is the starting point for CT operations, and asserts that operational training 
should be focused on patrol and non-specialized investigations, and that patrol officers 
need to develop abilities to recognize potential terrorist situations during routine field 
contacts.138 White claims that officers should learn to recognize the “who, what, where 
and how” of terrorism, just as they recognize the characteristics associated with a robbery 
or burglary.139 
A lack of training related to CT would logically equate to a lack of integration and 
engagement at the local level. In the protection of their communities, all threats must be 
136 Andrew Hawkes, “The History and Importance of Police Training,” Police Link, http://policelink. 
monster.com/training/articles/143993-the-history-and-importance-of-police-training. 
137 Ibid. 
138 White, Defending the Homeland, 64–68.  
139 Ibid., 65. 
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understood and addressed, which starts with training at the basic level. This level can 
serve as a building block in the education of an officer, and can be continually developed 
upon throughout an officer’s career during the next level of training.  
C. IN-SERVICE LEVEL—VETERAN 
Pre-9/11, most CT activities and investigations were federal initiatives, but post-
9/11, every police officer in the United States plays some role in the nation’s overall HS 
effort, and thus, requires training for state and local LE.140 A change of mindset for local 
LE is required, which includes veteran officers who have been trained and conditioned to 
police within the traditional model.  
A challenge of training and educating veteran officers on a new practice or way of 
doing business is a resistance from within police culture, and more specifically, a 
sentiment of “cynicism” to new ideas. In his classic work, Behind the Shield, Arthur 
Niederhoffer showed the stages of cynicism as the police recruit moves from the 
idealistic role models of the police academy to the street. He describes the first stage as 
pseudo-cynicism that occurs at the recruit level, an attitude that barely conceals the 
idealism and commitment beneath the surface. The second stage, romantic cynicism, 
occurs within the first five years, and finally stage three, aggressive cynicism, happens 
when resentment and hostility become obvious, a subculture of cynicism, the death of a 
spirit.141  
A negative view by veteran officers of integrating CT into the traditional policing 
mission can greatly hamper implementation and stifle an agency’s efforts to apply a new 
activity, while reaffirming the importance of leadership and sound policies supporting CT 
integration in conjunction with a training and educational component. “Buy-in” and 
support from all levels of an agency are critical to the shifting of the traditional policing 
paradigm to include CT. A starting point of department-wide training for all personnel, 
allows an agency to “sell” the importance, benefits, and relevancy of CT in today’s 21st 
century policing environment.  
140 Thibault et al., Proactive Police Management, 284. 
141 Ibid., 18–19. 
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Present LE efforts have not been sufficient in altering the more fundamental issue 
underlying the most effective methods for policing terrorism; an organizational culture 
that truly values the emergent threat of domestic terror and homegrown radicalization.142 
An essential component of shifting LE culture is training requirements and continued 
education directives that increase the awareness levels of state and local LE personnel.143  
A recent article in Law Enforcement Today discusses an absence of CT training 
for LE. Its author observes that an effort to incorporate terrorism awareness training into 
the traditional policing strategies of most police agencies is simply lacking, and in turn, 
this nation’s communities are exposed. According to Detective Brian J. Smith, a 16-year 
veteran police and DHS certified antiterrorism instructor, such training must be part of 
21st century policing in America and be incorporated into basic recruit academy training 
and annual in-service training at a minimum.144  
Once the first building blocks of terrorism have been established, further 
instruction for local officers may be enhanced based upon their assignment or the needs 
of their department. This area of training is depicted in this thesis as the specialized level 
of training.  
D. SPECIALIZED TRAINING 
In regard to specialized training related to CT, the state of California has led the 
way with the establishment of specialized CT officers within an agency. These officers 
are known as TLOs. The TLO program has also been implemented in coordination with 
state fusion centers in many other states throughout the United States. A TLO is an 
individual who functions as the principle point of contact for a public safety agency for 
142 Mayer and Erickson, “Changing Today’s Law Enforcement Culture to Face 21st-Century Threats.” 
143 Ibid. 




                                                 
other government agencies in the HS environment in matters related to terrorism 
information.145 
A 2013 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security 
observed that many TLO programs are in their infancy.146 They have been slow to roll 
out, and are too small to provide adequate coverage.147 Additionally, the TLO program is 
not a standardized practice nationally and has many variations, names, and applications.  
Another example of specialized terrorism training available for officers to develop 
their knowledge in CT is the DHS Prevention and Response to Suicide Bombing 
Incidents (PRSBI) training course for first responders. It has been in existence since 2003, 
and PRSBI was developed to provide state, tribal and local emergency responders with 
the knowledge and skills needed for the prevention, interdiction, response, and mitigation 
of a suicide bombing attack.148  
E. CONCLUSION 
Maples’ 2008 research revealed that clear, core competencies exist that LE 
officials in this country must be exposed to in relation to the causes, nature, and dynamics 
of terrorism. Currently, these core competencies are not being addressed in a consistent 
and standardized manner.149 A conclusive finding of his research was the fact that 
terrorism-related courses and training are not a required LE certification standard or 
competency in every state.150 This research points to a gap in terrorism training at the 
145 Terrorism Liaison Officer Information Network, “What Is a Terrorism Liaison Officer?” 
http://www.tlo.org/what_is_tlo.html.  
146 Michael T. McCaul and Peter T. King, Majority Staff Report on the National Network of Fusion 
Centers. The United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 113th Cong. (July 
2013). 
147 Ibid. 
148 New Mexico Tech, Energetic Materials Research and Training Center, “Department of Homeland 
Security First Responder Training,” emtrc.nmt.edu, 2010, http://www.emrtc.nmt.edu/training/. 
149 Maples, “Terrorism 101—Knowledge about the “What and Why” of Terrorism As a State and 
Local Law Enforcement Competency,” 73. 
150 Ibid., 40. 
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academy level for at least 40% of the states.151 This percentage represents a significant 
gap in the training of LE and a potential vulnerability for national HS.  
The training and education of local LE, as with any profession, will always be a 
work in progress, but the opportunity exists for local agencies to incorporate the topic of 
terrorism into their present and future educational curriculums. Ongoing international and 
domestic events clearly point to a legitimate threat of terrorism to the U.S. homeland by 
known terrorist groups. These events underscore the significance of having the local level 
of LE trained and educated to protect, prevent and mitigate an attack.  
Many of the practices and tactics presently taught to identify, detect, and combat 
criminal activity can be applied to a CT mission, as they are closely aligned with existing 
LE duties. Through an acknowledgement and prioritization of the threat, followed by 
training and education on the topic, the next step toward the integration of LE and CT can 
be introduced by a directed effort toward the gathering of information related to 
terrorism.  
151 Maples, “Terrorism 101—Knowledge about the “What and Why” of Terrorism As a State and 
Local Law Enforcement Competency,” 73. 
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VI. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
An examination of the integration of policing and CT includes an assessment of 
domestic intelligence gathering by local LE. The most effective weapon in the war on 
terrorism is intelligence, the detailed analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of 
information.152 The nucleus of this weapon is information collected and shared by 
federal, state, and local LE agencies. Intelligence begins as bits of raw information or 
data. Information becomes intelligence when it is organized, analyzed, and interpreted 
with a specific focus. The primary challenge for local LE is understanding and then 
utilizing intelligence in a community-policing context.153 
B. LOCAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTING  
In the detection, identification, and apprehension of a potential terrorist hiding in 
a community, existing relationships between local LE and the community could be the 
keys to developing information that may uncover someone plotting a future attack or 
someone planting the seeds of radicalization. Local LE has many lines of communication 
to gather information anonymously and overtly from the community. Local police are 
much more likely to come across a terrorism suspect than a federal LE agent, simply due 
to the law of probability. Stanley Supinski points out that cooperation, along with solid 
communication networks and increased trust, allows police to develop sources for 
information inside the community, which could provide vital intelligence relating to 
potential terror activity.154  
The gathering of intelligence and the subsequent sharing of such within the LE 
spectrum are critical elements in the mitigation of an attack within local communities. 
152 Stephan A. Loyka, Donald A. Faggiani, and Clifford Karchmer, “Protecting Your Community 
from Terrorism: The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series VOL. 4: The Production and Sharing of 
Intelligence,” Police Executive Research Forum, 4, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/protect_ 
comm_terror_v4.pdf. 
153 Ibid.  
154 Page, “Community Policing Or Homeland Security: A ‘Sophie’s Choice’ for Police?,” 22. 
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Using existing relationships, local LE can use informal ties with the community to act as 
intelligence gatherers to aid in the prevention of terrorist attacks.155 Terror-related 
information developed from the “street’” can be quickly disseminated to local FBI-JTTFs 
and fusion centers for more in-depth analysis. 
America’s highly decentralized police system is both a strength and a weakness. It 
is a great strength because the police are better attuned to their local communities and are 
directly accountable to their concerns.156 However, it is also a terrible weakness in the 
post-9/11 world, where information sharing is key. Once LE has the information, it needs 
to make sense of it and share it immediately. It is critical that both horizontally and 
vertically LE overcomes its traditional reluctance to share information in a meaningful 
and timely fashion.157 Timely coordination and collaboration by local LE with federal 
and state partners is an important element of the intelligence process related to CT. 
Erroll Southers, a professor of CT at the University of Southern California, notes 
that much like the Madrid train bombings in 2004, and the July 2005 bombings in 
London, the terrorists’ familiarity with the target area afforded them critical situational 
awareness that facilitated their ability to plan and execute local attacks, but it also made 
them part of a community that could have singled them out and reported their suspicious 
behavior.158 Local LE can have a significant HS impact in this area, especially in the case 
of lone-wolf activities far smaller in size and scope and more difficult to detect than 
larger conspiracies. Thus, lone-wolf plots are not likely to cross the federal radar. No 
entity providing domestic security is better equipped to handle such threats than local LE 
agencies, which know and understand their own communities.159 Local LE’s ability to 
observe, receive, or develop information is clearly a major attribute of merging their 
existing mission with a role in CT. The following section outlines a standardized, simple, 
155 Chappell and Gibson, “Community Policing and Homeland Security Policing: Friend or Foe?,” 
329.  
156 George L. Kelling and William J. Bratton, “Policing Terrorism,” Manhattan Institute for Policy 
Research, Civic Bulletin, no. 43, September 2006, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cb_43.htm. 
157 Ibid. 
158 McCarter, “A Failure to Connect the Dots in Boston.”  
159 Mayer and Erickson, “Changing Today’s Law Enforcement Culture to Face 21st-Century Threats.” 
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and easily applied practice to capitalize upon local LE’s collection capacity and enable 
this level of LE to contribute easily in the information-sharing process related to HS.  
C. SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS  
Realistically, many small- and medium-sized local LE departments simply may 
not have the resources, funding, or willingness to staff, develop, and oversee a dedicated 
homeland or CT intelligence function. As previously discussed, a resource to support 
national information sharing is The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) 
Initiative (NSI), which grew out of the findings in the 9/11 Commission Report.160 The 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 and the 2007 
National Strategy for Information Sharing indicate both legislative and executive intent 
to establish locally controlled distributed information systems wherein potential 
terrorism-related information could be contributed by SLTT LE agencies for analysis to 
determine whether patterns or trends are emerging. Following this guidance, the SAR 
NSI was developed.161 The NSI provides the following training opportunities for officers 
and executive staff, which are facilitated through local fusion centers. 
• Line Officer Training (On-line): Assists LE officers in understanding 
what kinds of suspicious behaviors are associated with pre-incident 
terrorism activities, documenting and reporting suspicious activity, and 
protecting privacy, civil rights/liberties when documenting information.162 
• Suspicious Activity Reporting Executive Briefing Training: Designated 
for command personnel; noting that LE executives play a vital role in 
ensuring that the SAR process is not only successfully implemented but 
effectively supported, SAR executive briefings focus on executive 
leadership, policy development, privacy and civil liberties protections, 
agency training, and community outreach.163  
160 Markle Foundation Task Force Report, “Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland 
Security,” Markle Foundation, 2003, http://www.markle.org/publications/666-creating-trusted-network-
homeland-security. 
161 Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative, “About the NSI,” nsi.nsirc.gov, 
accessed October 24, 2013, http://nsi.ncirc.gov/about_nsi.aspx. 
162 Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative, “Training Overview,” nsi.nsirc.gov, 
accessed October 24, 2013, http://nsi.ncirc.gov/about_nsi.aspx. 
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From a LE perspective, the appeal of SARs is obvious. A SAR program reduces 
the opportunity costs of intelligence-led CT work because officers on the street continue 
to perform their traditional crime-fighting duties.164 They can follow protocols for 
reporting suspicious activity potentially related to threats with no substantial diversion 
from their “core mission of providing emergency and non-emergency services in order to 
prevent crime, violence and disorder.”165 SARs also reinforce the notion that every cop is 
the “eyes and ears” of the national CT effort. Consequently, both the Justice Department 
and DHS have encouraged police to adopt standardized SAR programs through the 
NSI.166 
SAR provides a basic starting point for local LE to engage in intelligence 
gathering related to CT. The other end of the spectrum is a policing concept known as 
intelligence-led policing, which is directed at full integration of intelligence gathering 
into the traditional policing mission.  
D. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
ILP is based on a common understanding of intelligence and its usefulness. ILP is 
defined as “the collection and analysis of information to produce an intelligence end-
product designed to inform police decision making at both the tactical and strategic 
levels.”167 For ILP to be effective, it must become an “integral part of an agency’s 
philosophy.”168 ILP is a management orientation in which intelligence serves as a guide 
to operations, rather than the reverse. Managers must be prepared to deviate from 
traditional policing philosophies, and move towards action rather than reaction. Above 
all, it requires commitment.169 




167 Loyka, Faggiani, and Karchmer, “Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: The Strategies for 
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ILP is the attempt to capitalize on this routine work, not for its traditional purpose 
of solving crimes, but proactively, to prevent and deter crime and now terrorism. To do 
this, computerized systems are needed to capture and structure the scraps of information 
in an easily accessible format. In this form, the scraps of information are called collated 
data. Data are not intelligence; to become intelligence, trained officers who use their 
knowledge and experience to recommend actions based on patterns in the data must 
analyze the data.170 ILP is an expensive enterprise and requires a total transformation of 
an agency’s policing strategy. This change can be a challenge for many local agencies 
struggling with shrinking budgets and diminished resources.  
The NYPD is the leading proponent of intelligence-led policing to combat 
terrorism.171 No department has embraced ILP as fully as the NYPD.172 In the aftermath 
of 9/11, Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly dedicated 1,000 officers to CT duties and 
recruited David Cohen, a 35-year CIA veteran, to run the intelligence division. The 
NYPD’s intelligence operations extend to bordering states, as well as overseas. No other 
local police department has a comparable program.173 Domestic police departments 
cannot match this investment, although it requires only a computerized database, 
intelligence officers and analysts. In smaller agencies, these resources are generally used 
to support investigations rather than to direct operations.174 Thus, for most, a general 
intelligence-gathering framework already exists to support departments that may consider 
the ILP model, which is a major component of the NYPD’s CT strategy.  
Newman and Clarke state in their Policing Terrorism an Executive’s Guide that 
agencies should promote ILP, but know its limits. Intelligence is highly skilled work, 
often beyond the capabilities of the officers that can be deployed.175  
170 Loyka, Faggiani, and Karchmer, “Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: The Strategies for 
Local Law Enforcement Series VOL. 4: The Production and Sharing of Intelligence,” 19. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Dr. George Kelling has persuasively argued that police can prevent terrorism with 
many of the same mechanisms they have developed over the last 20 years to prevent 
crime.176 Local intelligence gathering can seemingly be applied as a useful tool in the 
application of CT. The opportunity for local LE officers to encounter or gather a vital 
piece of intelligence related to terrorism clearly exists during the performance of their 
traditional duties.  
Intelligence gathering is the operational component in the formative process of 
local LE and CT integration. The combining of this element with the components of 
leadership, and education and training, finalizes what this thesis asserts, the three most 
significant components in local LE to establish the groundwork to incorporate CT into 
their existing policing mission. The next chapter outlines a conceptual model that 
demonstrates how these components can be applied in Anytown, USA to integrate CT 
into their existing LE mission. 
176 Mark Riebling, “Hard Won Lessons: The New Paradigm—Merging Law Enforcement and 
Counterterrorism Strategies,” Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Safe Cities Project, January 2006, 
3, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/scr_04.pdf. 
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VII. LOCAL INTEGRATION = L.E.A.D. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To address the issues surrounding the integration of local LE and CT, this thesis 
proposes a prescriptive model known as L.E.A.D. The intent of this model is to assist 
Anytown, USA in incorporating CT into their existing LE mission. Like traditional 
crime, terrorism is a local crime issue and is a responsibility shared among federal, state, 
and local governments, traditional crime and terrorism are inextricably linked.177 
International and domestic terrorist groups are well organized and trained, and 
demonstrate the sophistication of other, traditional organized crime groups. These groups 
commit ancillary crimes like fraud, money laundering, drug trafficking, and theft to 
provide the resources for their terrorism. Due to the similarities between traditional crime 
and terrorism, departments that have already adopted a community policing philosophy 
should find it a seamless transition to addressing terrorism and terrorism-related crime. 
Officers should already have the skills to analyze the terrorism problem, perform threat 
analysis, develop appropriate responses, and reflect these efforts in the mission, goals, 
and objectives of the department.178 
It is oftentimes said in the traditional policing world that, “crime is everyone’s 
business,” meaning LE, other government agencies, citizens, and the private sector are all 
part of the solution. This thesis asserts that HS is also everyone’s business and a 360-
degree approach is needed to protect this nation’s communities. The L.E.A.D. model is 
characterized by the following acronym.  
L—LEAD 
E—EDUCATE & TRAIN 
A—ACTIVELY COLLECT INTELLIGENCE 
D—DETECT TERRORISTS 
177 Docobo, “Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at the 
Local Law Enforcement Level.”  
178 Ibid. 
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This chapter provides a description of the individual components of L.E.A.D. and 
shows how they can build upon each other to form ultimately a comprehensive 
conceptual model for local LE to incorporate CT into their traditional policing mission. 
Additionally, how this model can be applied in a simple, flexible and low cost manner 
without the disruption of core local LE competencies is demonstrated. Once again, 
leadership is the catalyst or starting point for the integration of CT into the DNA of local 
LE.  
B. LEAD (L) 
This thesis asserts that HS does start with hometown security, and begins by 
individual local LE agencies leading the way toward the integration of CT into their 
existing missions. CT should fall under their responsibility of proactively contributing to 
the safety and security of their localities. Although, this integration requires individual 
agency leadership and ownership to address the threat of terror directly in a cooperative 
effort with their state and federal partners.  
Effective police leaders become adept at responding to challenge. Like other 
organizations, police agencies must balance constancy and predictability with adaptation 
and change. Even as they strive to standardize operations, most police leaders recognize 
the fluid context in which their agencies operate. They also understand that forces exist to 
which police organizations must adapt and evolve to remain effective in a changing 
world. Those forces drive organizational change and create new models for conducting 
the business of policing.179  
A central theme of this thesis is that a failure to apply the strengths of policing 
may create an opportunity with deadly local consequences. Local agencies that fail to 
embrace some form of CT and rely solely on the federal government to prevent terrorism 
seemingly do so at the perilous risk of their communities. This thesis asserts that CT 
integration starts by chiefs, sheriffs, and command personnel accepting the reality that in 
179 Anthony W. Batts, Sean Michael Smoot, and Ellen Scrivner, “Police Leadership Challenges in a 
Changing World,” U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1, July 2012, https://ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/238338.pdf. 
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the 21st century, the threat of terrorism is real, constantly evolving, and not going away 
anytime soon, as difficult as that may be to acknowledge. 
Acronyms are commonplace in the policing world and stand as easy to use catch 
phrases for meaning and memory. The following acronym reiterates the potential threat 
of terrorism to local LE leaders, as in “U ARE Vulnerable,” which is outlined as a 
subcategory in the (L) of the L.E.A.D. model.  
1. U—UNDERSTAND the Threat 
Local LE leadership must educate themselves on the threat of terror from 
homegrown and international entities. Only then will they begin to understand the 
ideologies, tactics, and methods of those who would seek to do harm in their 
communities. Leaders must understand that a domestic attack could occur at any time and 
in any place. In the effective protection of local communities, LE leadership must take 
the threat of terrorism seriously.  
A significant basic step toward CT activity for local LE is in the reporting of 
suspicious activity observed or reported in their locality, which starts with local leaders 
establishing a viable relationship with their local fusion center and FBI-JTTF. This 
endeavor can be initiated by participation in fusion center sponsored NSI SAR executive 
briefing training for command personnel.  
Another starting point to “jumpstart” CT at the local level is outside funding. 
Newman and Clarke in Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide recommend that 
agencies go after terrorism grants, stating, “Grant funds can help you meet your 
responsibilities regarding terrorism by paying for equipment, training, and overtime.”180 
The guide provides numerous state and federal resources for grant funding. Grant writing 
is not a new dynamic for local LE in the search for funding to solve problems and 
supplement dwindling budgets. Local agencies just need to identify and apply for existing 
grants opportunities related to HS. For example, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), which provides state and local governments with preparedness 
180 Newman and Clarke, Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide. 
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program funding in the form of non-disaster grants to enhance the capacity of state and 
local emergency responders to prevent, respond to, and recover from a weapons of mass 
destruction terrorism incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 
explosive devices, and cyber-attacks.181 The DHS has also prioritized prevention 
activities through their grants that directly support local LE efforts to understand, 
recognize, prepare for, prevent, and respond to terrorist pre-cursor activity, and 
separately, to raise public awareness and vigilance.182  
The key components of understanding the threat are enhancing an agency’s 
command level IQ of terrorism, initiating information sharing with state and federal 
partners, and exploring federal grant funding opportunities to facilitate CT activity. Once 
terrorism is understood, an agency must acknowledge that the threat exists and 
incorporate this possibility into its strategic plan.  
2. A—ACKNOWLEDGE the Threat 
In the aftermath of an attack in Anytown, USA, pre-incident local efforts of 
prevention, detection, and protection will certainly be spotlighted. This thesis argues that 
now is the time to acknowledge rationally the threat of terrorism and develop a “game 
plan” for contributing to the mitigation of an attack. Local LE is already proactively 
identifying, detecting, and protecting the public from violent criminals, which should also 
include terrorists.  
The Boston Marathon bombers, the Tsarnaevs, got recipes for the pressure-cooker 
IEDs common on battlefields in Afghanistan and “elbow” pipe bombs from online 
instructions published four years ago in Inspire, a terrorist magazine published by al 
Qaeda’s affiliate AQAP. AQAP offered wannabe jihadis instructions for both types of 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) under the headline “Make a bomb in the kitchen of 
181 “Preparedness (Non-Disaster) Grants,” accessed June 15, 2014, http://www.fema.gov/ 
preparedness-non-disaster-grants.  
182 “Countering Violent Extremism,” accessed June 15, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/topic/countering-
violent-extremism.  
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your mom.”183 This level of access is important, because in the United States, unfettered 
Internet access is available to all, which provides for a communication, educational, and 
financial platform for would-be terrorists that emphasizes the continual need for 
proactive local LE efforts in a CT role.  
The attack in Boston serves as a recent tangible reminder that terror can strike any 
place, at any time. Basic crime prevention is based upon two principles, harden the target 
and reduce the opportunity, which this thesis argues can also be applied to terrorism. 
Many police chiefs concede that CT is not a high priority in their jurisdictions; however, 
in areas in which the threat is less urgent and less defined, lower-priority environments 
especially, police can gain “economies of preparedness” by building CT into their routine 
work. Every citizen-police interaction is an opportunity to pursue anomalies by asking 
the next question. Every training session provides a way to impart awareness. Merging 
LE and CT in this way cannot only make this nation’s states and cities safer, but can also 
save them money.184 Engagement in CT does not need to be a new stand-alone practice 
that requires additional resources; integration can be achieved with minimal change in the 
existing LE mission.  
3. R—REASSESS the Mission 
CT under this model is not necessarily a separate function requiring separate new 
staff or the creation of a unit that is going to do CT only. “It’s about getting everybody 
involved at some level,” Tim Connors, Director of the Center for Policing Terrorism, 
explains. Maintaining that involvement is the key to maintaining vigilance in this 
country, in a world in which terrorism will, it is hoped, remain rare.185 
183 James Gordon Meek and Brian Ross, “Could the Boston Bombers Have Been Stopped?,” ABC 
News, April 15, 2014. 
184 Riebling, “Hard Won Lessons: The New Paradigm—Merging Law Enforcement and 
Counterterrorism Strategies,” 12. 
185 Ibid. 
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Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard once said, “There are two ways to be 
fooled. One is to believe what isn’t true; the other is to refuse to believe what is true.”186 
Local LE cannot ignore or disregard the potential for terrorism to strike in their 
communities. The burden of terror detection and mitigation cannot fall on one or two 
levels of government; it must include all three.  
The cornerstone of local LE engagement in CT is dependent upon the 
development of standardized training curricula and policies related to CT for all 
personnel of that agency. A universal curriculum for all LE agencies presents a 
significant challenge for 18,000 agencies, but this thesis asserts that individual agencies 
can develop CT training and policy with support from existing federal training programs 
that can be tailored to the needs, resources, and threats of their localities.  
The following section explains how the strengths of existing local LE practices 
can be applied in CT when combined with the incorporation of smart practices from two 
international LE entities.  
4. E—ENGAGE in Counterterrorism 
In the protection of their communities, local LE are identifying, targeting, and 
pursuing traditional violent criminals, those who pose a significant threat to the safety 
and security of their community. LE utilizes the strengths of community-oriented 
policing to garner support and empower the community to be an active partner in the 
eradication of crime. Engagement in CT at the local level can be implemented by using 
the same techniques to combat traditional criminal activity; remembering that in the 
detection and mitigation of crime, strong communication ties with the community have 
proven to be an invaluable resource of this endeavor.  
a. The Australians 
Two components of the Victoria, Australia police are important to note for U.S. 
local LE implementation. The first is an organization-wide responsibility of not assigning 
186 “No Money, No Jobs and a Higher Cost of Living: The Reality of Life under PF,” April 16, 2014, 
http://www.lusakatimes.com/2014/04/16/moneyno-jobs-higher-cost-living-reality-life-pf/.  
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CT duties to an individual unit or officer. Their strategy is a broad, all-encompassing one 
that demands engagement from all members of the organization. This thesis asserts that 
for U.S. efforts, especially in smaller departments, it is a practical approach to emulate.  
Secondly, the partnership driven part of their strategy complements existing CP 
efforts already widely used in the states by local LE; the incorporation of CT into this 
practice would seemingly be easy to accomplish. A partnership driven approach also 
fosters a holistic approach to CT, the benefits of which are discussed further in the 
conceptualization of the L.E.A.D. model. 
b. CONTEST 
Elements of the UK’s CONTEST can be applied into the U.S. local LE mission 
by implementing the following. 
• Prevent: Utilize the strengths of CP to partner with their citizenry in the 
identification of vulnerable citizens who may be headed toward 
radicalization. Mandate DHS sponsored programs to educate and train 
personnel and the community in the countering of violent extremism 
(CVE). 
• Protect: Through DHS programs, develop and create CT security advisors 
for each local LE office, station, or precinct to identify and assess critical 
sites, in conjunction with existing duties, and not as a stand-alone 
assignment. This implementation can be started by using DHS’ “National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 2013, Partnering for Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” which provides guidance and 
training for local governments, private businesses, and citizens to 
participate in the protection of their communities.187  
• Prepare: Establish a TLO in every local LE office in a two-fold capacity. 
As a direct liaison between state and federal entities on matters related to 
HS, and to ensure officers are trained and up-to-date on the most current 
trends, tactics, and methods related to terrorism. This implementation can 
be initiated by participation in no cost DHS training programs available 
on-line, in house, or off site, such as the state and local LE anti-terrorism 
training program. Once again, resources are not needed for a stand-alone 
position; these duties can be performed in concert with traditional duties.  
187 “National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013, Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience,” last published November 19, 2014, https://www.dhs.gov/national-infrastructure-protection-
plan.  
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• Pursue: Local LE can apply the detection of potential terrorists as another 
layer in their policing package, in a coordinated effort with their state and 
federal counterparts just as locals seek to identify, target, and apprehend 
traditional violent offenders who threaten their communities. Who, what, 
where, when, and how of terrorists can be applied to patrol activity, 
intelligence gathering, and community interactions. 
The words terrorist and criminal need to be synonymous in the policing 
environment; the same tools used to identify, target, and apprehend traditional criminals 
in local communities can be applied to terrorism. A threat clearly exists, locals are in a 
position to contribute, and community partnerships have proven to be an effective tool in 
curbing crime and assisting in CT. “Homeland security begins with local law 
enforcement and the community. The collection of information at the community level is 
critical to the overall homeland security mission. That’s where it all starts for every city 
and town in the United States.”188  
Building upon the understanding, acknowledgement, and engagement of local LE 
leadership, the next step of this model is to educate and train on the subject matter. The 
next section details how local LE and their community stakeholders can accomplish this 
task.  
C. EDUCATION AND TRAINING  
“Terrorism was by no means a new problem for the United States in 2001, nor 
were state and local governments uninvolved in the counterterrorism effort before then. 
The 1990s alone saw the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City 
bombing, and the series of attacks by “Unabomber” Theodore Kaczynski.”189 This thesis 
asserts that to achieve a secure homeland, all three levels of government must be engaged 
in CT. In this nation’s effort to protect its citizens effectively from terrorism, the absence 
of HS cannot exist within any local community.  
188 Stephen Doherty and Bradley G. Hibbard, “Community Policing and Homeland Security,” The 
Police Chief, 73, no. 2 (February 2006): 79, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm? 
fuseaction=display&article_id=812&issue_id=22006. 
189 Waxman, “Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism 
after 9/11,” 380.  
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This protection starts with a holistic approach of raising the terrorism IQ within 
each individual locality that includes local LE, other local government agencies, citizens, 
elected officials, and the private sector. Local LE can lead this effort by first educating 
and training themselves and then developing training programs that target the 
aforementioned groups.  
1. Local Law Enforcement Training 
The state of California has led the way in the United States with the establishment 
of specialized CT officers within an agency, who are known as TLOs. Further 
recommendations of U.S. local LE and TLO implementation were outlined in the 
“prepare” section of letter “L” of this model. This duty could be executed in concert with 
their existing position, and therefore, not deplete resources from the field or create new 
positions or units.  
Local training can be accomplished through participation in “no cost” DHS 
training programs available on-line, “in house,” or off site, such as the SLATT by the 
U.S. DOJ. SLATT provides the tools necessary for officers to understand, detect, deter, 
and investigate acts of terrorism in the United States by both international and domestic 
terrorists.190 
A start for local LE in this direction is to identify and develop an “in house” SME 
or TLO, through the aforementioned training opportunities. These individuals can 
provide CT instruction to department personnel and liaise with state and federal partners 
on issues related to HS in a TLO capacity. An important aspect of this role is that it is 
performed in duality with existing duties, much like a field-training officer or firearms 
instructor; it does not disrupt core service, but does provide an agency-based SME/TLO 
to coordinate CT activity. 
190 “State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT),” accessed June 13, 2014, https://www. 
slatt.org/SLATT.  
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a. Basic Level 
The basic or academy level is the most logical point to integrate a new concept or 
practice into an individual’s and department’s policing package. This thesis recommends 
a four- to eight-hour block of instruction related to the threat, tactics, techniques, and 
practices of terrorists for inclusion in each agency or state basic LE training curriculum. 
A pre-designated and pre-trained agency TLO or SME would coordinate and conduct 
such training. This thesis asserts that in the post-9/11 policing environment, CT training 
is a necessary and essential component of the 21st century local LE training curriculum. 
Once new officers have been exposed to an initial instruction of the topic, their 
knowledge and skill can be continually enhanced and updated through annual 
department-wide training. 
b. Department-Wide Training  
It is recommended that each local LE officer be initially trained in an eight-hour 
block of instruction that is developed in the same manner as the basic level on CT. This 
type of training can be integrated into annual in-service training requirements, again, 
taught at no cost, by trained and predetermined officers from within their department. It is 
further recommended that post-initial training, a minimum of four hours of CT updates, 
trends, and tactics can be taught online or through roll call training to every officer each 
calendar year by their TLO/SME. 
Based on the needs and resources of an individual agency, the next level of 
training can be extended or limited. It is important to note that in the integration of CT as 
a core competency, the specialized level is a key component of the process.  
c. Specialized Training  
This level of training can be directed at agency TLO/SMEs and personnel 
assigned to specialized duties within a department. A source of training is the DHS, 
which provides terrorism training to local LE through the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center (FLETC). FLETC provide tuition-free and low cost training to state, 
local, campus, tribal, and territorial LE agencies. Programs are conducted across the 
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United States and are normally hosted by a local LE agency. Training is also conducted at 
FLETC facilities located in Glynco, Georgia, Artesia, New Mexico, Charleston, South 
Carolina, and Cheltenham, Maryland.191  
The Technical Resource for Incident Prevention (TRIPwire) is DHS’s free, online 
information-sharing resource on IED incidents, tactics, techniques, and procedures, as 
well as corresponding IED prevention and protective measures. TRIPwire enhances 
domestic preparedness by giving the nation’s security and emergency services 
professionals valuable information and resources to prevent, protect, respond to, and 
mitigate bombing incidents.192 
Additionally, since 2003, the DHS has sponsored training in the PRSBI for first 
responders. The PRSBI course was developed to provide senior state, tribal, and local 
emergency responders with the knowledge and skills needed to develop policies for the 
prevention, interdiction, response, and mitigation of a suicide bombing attack.193 PRSBI 
is a five-day course conducted in Socorro, New Mexico, at the New Mexico Institute of 
Mining and Technology, and is taught by local and state LE SMEs from across the 
country. The training, transportation, and lodging are at no cost to first responders. 
PRSBI includes the observation of actual detonations of suicide device designs, and 
students also receive instruction in threat tactics unique to suicide bombing scenarios and 
appropriate, effective countermeasures.194 
The above examples provide options for local LE to educate, train, and raise their 
level of knowledge in CT, all without incurring significant cost, time, or the exhaustion 
of significant local resources. An added benefit of the federally supported training 
programs is that these programs are continually updated and evolving to the emerging 
191 “State and Local Training,” accessed June 29, 2014, http://www.fletc.gov/osl.  
192 “Tripwire,” July 10, 2014, https://tripwire.dhs.gov/IED/appmanager/IEDPortal/IEDDesktop?_nfpb 
=true&_pageLabel=LOGIN.  
193 New Mexico Tech, Energetic Materials Research and Training Center, “Department of Homeland 
Security First Responder Training.”  
194 Richard G. Priem and Dennis M. Hunter, “Terrorists and Suicide Tactics: Preparing for the 
Challenge,” The Police Chief 74, no. 9, September 2007, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/ 
index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1265&issue_id=92007. 
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trends of terrorism. Individual agencies can develop a dynamic training continuum based 
upon their needs, resources, and threat conditions; “a one-size fits all” approach is not 
recommended, nor is a one-time training effort. CT training must be continual and evolve 
with the tactics, techniques, and methods employed by terrorists. 
At the local level, LE cannot shoulder the entire burden for terrorist detection and 
mitigation of attack. The L.E.A.D. approach emphasizes that contributions from 
throughout a community are needed to implement an effective local CT strategy.  
2. A Holistic Approach to Local Counterterrorism 
In the protection of local communities, local LE cannot be the only contributor or 
entity engaged in CT. This thesis asserts that LE should be the catalyst for CT locally, but 
that a holistic approach is needed to include the training and education of other local 
government agencies, elected officials, the community, and private sector entities to 
assist in CT. 
a. Fire Service 
A logical local partner with an opportunity to contribute in a CT role would be the 
fire service, which in all localities routinely interacts with the community, responds to 
emergency incidents, and conducts residential and commercial inspections. With their 
access to private property, their contacts in the local community, and the levels of trust 
they enjoy, firefighters can do more than simply respond to situations posing physical 
danger. They can actually gather, make sense of, and report on circumstances that might 
hint at terrorist involvement and intent, helped in part by community networks they 
construct to recognize risks.195 Training on the who, what, where, how, and why of 
terrorism can be conducted by local LE on a continual basis to enhance firefighters’ 
ability to recognize suspicious persons, materials, or activity, and create a sustainable 
partnership with local fire departments. 
195 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, “‘Firefighters’ Developing Role in 
Counterterrorism,” Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Policing Terrorism Report, no. 3, August 
2008, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/ptr_03.htm. 
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Individual localities need to be mindful of issues of concern related to the fire 
service and CT, as the potential exists for the abuse of authority and the damaging of 
community relations. Given the broad license that firefighters have to enter all kinds of 
buildings without a search warrant, the question arises, should firefighters actively serve 
as the eyes and ears of CT efforts; that is, go beyond their normal responsibilities of 
inspection and actually search for evidence of possible terrorist activity?196 Therefore, 
both fire and police need to establish clear policies and protocols for fire service 
information collection and sharing, to ensure that fire departments do not engage in active 
intelligence gathering, but rather, are trained to recognize and report suspicious activity to 
LE.  
b. Other Municipal Departments 
The training of other municipal government departments by local LE, such as 
public works and public utilities, on the recognition of suspicious activity would enhance 
a local “eyes and ears” strategy of detecting a pre-operational terrorist, as these 
departments are active in the community and stand in a position to observe and report 
something suspicious from many unconventional vantage points. Once again, direct 
engagement by local LE with these entities can strengthen partnerships, build trust, and 
potentially, create an outlet to gather information, which may lead to the mitigation of a 
local attack. 
c. Elected Officials 
In the implementation of a new, possibly misunderstood and controversial 
activity, the training and education of locally elected officials is an essential element of 
CT and LE integration. Local LE leadership can work to educate officials on an 
understanding of the threat, what local CT engagement does and does not mean, and how 
local integration of CT is an essential element of overall HS.  
An example of a municipal government engaging its citizenry on the topic of 
terrorism is the City of Boston, which in partnership with the Boston police department, 
196 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, “‘Firefighters’ Developing Role in 
Counterterrorism.” 
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publishes a “Community Response Guide for Terrorism,” whose target audience is 
residents, workers, and visitors of their city. See Figure 3. Former Mayor Thomas M. 
Menino had asked the people of Boston to join with public safety personnel “to secure 
our City.” He stated, “As the nation’s concerns about terrorism intensify, we must 
educate ourselves so that we are able to respond effectively and appropriately in the event 
of an emergency. While we must remain vigilant and aware of the serious threat of 
terrorism, we must not allow our concerns to consume us.”197 
 
Figure 3.  Boston Community Response Guide  
A significant benefit of the ability of LE to educate elected leaders is funding, 
which through “buy in” could facilitate efforts to integrate CT into a locality’s policing 
mission. The importance of CT must be framed to elected officials in the following 
context, “It is important to remember that in the unfortunate event of an attack, the eyes 
of the world will descend on their community and ask what they did or did not do to 
prevent this tragic loss of life from occurring.”  
197 “Terrorism: A Community Response, “A Guide for Boston’s Residents, Workers, and Visitors,” 
https://www.cityofboston.gov/images_documents/familypreparedness_tcm3-8955.pdf. 
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d. The Community 
Local LE in most cases is already heavily invested in community crime 
prevention efforts to reduce crime and protect their citizenry that includes public 
awareness, training, as well as social and traditional media outlets for reporting 
suspicious activity. The inclusion of the topic of terrorism can be accomplished in the 
same manner, in concert with existing efforts rather than as a competing strategy. Public 
events, community meetings, casual interaction, and official department communication 
all provide an opportunity to educate the public on how they can assist local LE in the 
protection of their communities from terrorism. The signs and indicators of suspicious 
activity, persons, and materials related to terrorism can be conveyed to the public using 
the strengths of community policing. A resource that can easily be applied at the local 
level is the DHS nationwide, “If You See Something, Say Something” public awareness 
campaign (seen in Figure 4), which provides a simple and effective program to raise 
public awareness of indicators of terrorism and terrorism-related crime, and to emphasize 
the importance of reporting suspicious activity to the proper local LE authorities.198  
 
Figure 4.  DHS See Something Say Something Poster  
198 “If You See Something Say Something,” July 10, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/if-you-see-something-
say-something.  
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The DHS sees this resource as a way to both empower Americans to participate in 
this nation’s security and to build important relationships between citizens and local LE 
agencies to ensure local authorities have the information they need to stop terrorist 
attacks.199 The strength and benefits of training and educating the local populous is to 
encourage quality and relevant information that may have a nexus to terrorism or 
criminal activity, rather than overburdening local LE with an influx of irrelevant or vague 
information that can waste time and drain resources.  
e. Private Sector 
The private sector has an important role to play in local hometown security for the 
following reasons. In some cases, it may have critical infrastructure responsibilities, and 
may be the target of an attack, such as a symbolic location, critical resource, or heavily 
populated location. For this reason, it is essential to engage the private sector and create 
viable relationships. Additionally, items of interest to terrorists may be sold by private 
entities within an individual’s jurisdiction. An available online DHS resource to assist 
local LE with businesses involved in the sale of lawful materials that could be used as 
components of an IED is the Office of Bombing Prevention’s TRIPwire program, which 
offers printable bomb making awareness posters and cards that can be printed and 
distributed by local LE to the related businesses in their jurisdiction.  
In the UK, a program designed to protect, enhance resiliency, and partner with the 
private sector is Project ARGUS, which has been widely popular. Project ARGUS is an 
initiative that asks businesses and other organizations to consider their preparedness for a 
terrorist attack. It achieves this preparedness by guiding people through a simulated 
multi-media attack, which identifies the measures that can assist in preventing, handling, 
and recovering from such an incident. It explores what is likely to happen in the event of 
a terrorist attack. It highlights the importance of being prepared and having the necessary 
plans in place to help safeguard staff, visitors, and assets. The events are free of charge 
and most last for approximately three hours.200 Once local LE TLOs have been 
199 “If You See Something Say Something.” 
200 “Project Argus, Our Services,” nactso.gov. http://www.nactso.gov.uk/our-services.  
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established, they can serve as liaisons to partner, train and develop programs like 
ARGUS to empower local businesses to reduce their opportunity of a terrorist activity. 
The second section of the L.E.A.D. model outlined the three levels of local LE 
training that can have an impact on the integration of CT into the policing continuum, in 
addition to a community or “holistic” educational approach that involves the fire service, 
other municipal departments, elected officials, citizens, and the private sector. This 
approach directly ties in to the third component of L.E.A.D., the active gathering of 
intelligence from local communities related to terrorism.  
D. ACTIVELY COLLECT INTELLIGENCE  
CT begins with basic information. It is not some exotic notion straight out of the 
latest James Bond movie. LE becomes too confused by the bureaucratic rules and 
regulations, a misunderstanding of intelligence, and its own fetish for secrecy. Good 
information comes from everyday sources, and intelligence gathering is often nothing 
more than good police work; the key is knowing what to look for and knowing when, 
where, and how to share information.201 Local LE is already heavily engaged in 
intelligence gathering related to traditional criminal activity; once a department’s 
personnel have been trained and educated on terrorism, the how and who to share 
information related to terrorism with is all that is then needed.  
A comprehensive manual directed primarily toward state, local, and tribal LE 
agencies of all sizes that need to develop or reinvigorate their intelligence function is the 
DOJ, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services’ Law Enforcement Intelligence: A 
Guide for State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies. Rather than being a 
manual to teach a person how to be an intelligence analyst, it is directed toward that 
manager, supervisor, or officer who is assigned to create an intelligence function. It is 
intended to provide ideas, definitions, concepts, policies, and resources.202  
201 White, Defending the Homeland, 39. 
202 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies, iii. 
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At a minimum, an easy and simple starting point for local LE to share information 
that may be related to terrorism or HS is through a SAR program. An outline of this 
program, along with the ways local LE can integrate SAR into their existing duties, is 
provided in the following section. 
1. Suspicious Activity Reporting  
Engagement in SAR is a “no brainer” for local LE. Once command and field 
personnel have been initially trained, SARs can be quickly integrated into existing 
policing efforts. This thesis asserts that terrorism-related information is different from 
traditional criminal information, in that such information may have national or 
international implications, and therefore, it is of vital importance to share terror-related 
information in a timely and standardized manner with local FBI-JTTF and state fusion 
centers. The following NSI documents shown in Figure 5 provide guidelines for the 
implementation of SAR at the local level.  
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Figure 5.  NSI 10 Ways to Integrate SAR (continues on next page)  
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The integration of SAR into any size department should start with a keen 
understanding by agency leadership of how to capture suspicious information lawfully 
and with whom to share it in a standardized format. NSI-sponsored programs 
administered through state and major urban area fusion centers are available to facilitate 
that need. This training should be mandated by individual department policy to ensure all 
personnel engaging in SAR activity have been properly trained and are adhering to 
standardized practices to protect civil liberties.  
In the performance of its traditional duties, local LE has numerous opportunities 
to gather information related to terrorism actively. The collection of this information can 
be accomplished in concert with existing duties of gathering intelligence related to 
criminal activity within their localities.  
2. Local Intelligence Integration 
Local LE officers have numerous opportunities during the performance of their 
duties to gather intelligence related to terrorism, via personal observation, citizen 
interaction, and criminal interdiction. It is assumed that local police conduct daily 
debriefs of arrestees, suspicious persons, confidential sources, and concerned citizens on 
a host of issues related to traditional criminal activity, such as violence, robbery, gangs, 
drugs and guns. Thus, an opportunity exists for CT integration with a minimal disruption 
of existing practices.  
In an effort to detect and mitigate terrorist activity, local LE questioning and 
consensual contact can slightly shift to include inquiries related to extremism and 
radicalization also, such as, “Do you know anyone with radical views who may be 
looking to commit a violent act?” Local LE should continue to focus on traditional crime, 
but integrate CT into their overall mission, to include intelligence gathering. A significant 
factor in successfully thwarting an attack is to develop information and identify the 
perpetrators pre-attack, as terrorists operate in the shadows and do not operate overtly.  
Local LE uses the strengths of its partnerships, contacts, and relationships through 
the CP model to impact criminal activity. This same strategy can be applied to the 
detection of terrorists or extremists hiding within their communities.  
 79 
3. Countering Violent Extremism  
In the UK, the Prevent component of their CONTEST identifies pre-incident 
engagement with members of the community as a key objective; essentially, to engage 
the hearts and minds of the local citizenry, “To disrupt those who promote violent 
extremism and support people living in the communities where they may operate.”203 
Basically, it is a concerted effort by police to curb radicalization and reach out to those 
who based on socio-economic, geo-political, cultural, or religious disposition, may be at a 
high risk for involvement in an act of terrorism.204 In the 21st century, police, community 
partnerships are essential in reducing crime, and in CT, through Prevent and other LE 
initiatives, as UK CT police emphasize the value of police-community relationships and 
the importance of learning. These valuable lessons are stressed because of the vital role 
they play in building community-based CT capabilities.205 
In August 2011, the White House released a report, Empowering Local Partners 
to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. This report states that government and 
LE at the local level have well-established relationships with communities, developed 
through years of consistent engagement, and therefore, can effectively build partnerships 
and take action on the ground.206 As part of its effort to support local networks to counter 
violent extremism, the DHS has launched a number of core initiatives. 
• DHS Conferences and Workshops on CVE: The DHS hosts conferences 
and workshops for LE to educate them better about CVE. 
• Training Initiatives: The DHS is working with the DOJ, and has trained 
hundreds of thousands of front line officers on SAR and CVE. 
203 House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee, “Preventing Violent 
Extremism,” publications.parliament.uk, March 16, 2010, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ 
cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/6502.htm. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Dan Silk, “Community Policing to Prevent Violent Extremism,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 
October 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/october-2012/ 
community-policing-to-prevent-violent-extremism. 
206 House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.  
 80 
                                                 
• Grants: The DHS has prioritized prevention activities through grants that 
directly support local LE efforts to understand, recognize, prepare for, 
prevent, and respond to terrorist pre-cursor activity.207 
Through DHS support, local LE can develop CVE programs in concert with 
existing community policing efforts to identify individuals in the community who may be 
headed toward radicalization. A CVE community outreach is especially important based 
on recent ongoing events in Syria and Iraq, where ISIS has been incredibly successful in 
recruiting westerners to join the fight. The potential of trained and experienced Jihadists 
re-entering the United States and assimilating back in to local communities should be of 
concern to local LE and their citizenry, as these individuals may pose a risk of plotting an 
act of terrorism on domestic soil.  
4. Community—Power of the People 
Locals are the closest LE entity to the people, who are literally, the “eyes and 
ears” of a community. Outside of traditional LE contacts, information solicited and 
received from an educated public could be the invaluable piece of information needed to 
connect the “proverbial dot” to thwart an attack. As the FBI pointed out immediately 
after the Boston attack, terrorists are somebody’s neighbor, co-worker, friend, or relative. 
It is clear that this nation’s safety depends on all U.S. citizens reporting suspicious 
activities, regardless of the intimate relationship they may have with the people they 
suspect. While it is not desirable to return to the days of the Red Scare, when many 
Americans lived in fear of being falsely accused of having communist ties, it is crucial 
not to become complacent. Since 9/11, many have become detached from the reality that 
terrorists continue to organize, train, and scheme to harm the United States and its 
people.208 
Chapter III discussed CP as a key component of community relations, which also 
significantly applies to the development of a model to integrate CT at the local level. The 
2012 IACP publication Building Communities of Trust: A Guidance for Community 
207 “Countering Violent Extremism.”  
208 Herma Percy, “Start Snitching: The Public’s Role in Fighting Terrorism,” The Baltimore Sun, May 
5, 2013. 
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Leaders is a comprehensive guide for local LE leaders to use as they move toward the 
integration of CT into their policing mission. LE agencies have long recognized the need 
to develop trusting relationships with the communities they serve.  
As engagement in CT may be a new concept for many local LE agencies; such 
efforts may be misunderstood or pose uncertainty for members of the community. The 
BCOT initiative is directed at abating fear and building faith in LE within a community 
to impact crime and terrorism. A particular focus of BCOT has been working with 
immigrant and minority communities that have historically had negative or distrusting 
relationships with LE, which makes it especially important to help these communities 
address any concerns the community members may have with LE, so that everyone can 
work together to prevent criminal and terrorist activity. Information garnered from 
community members may provide key information to facilitate the prevention of a 
potential attack, and residents are more likely to report this activity to LE if a positive, 
trustworthy relationship is in place.209  
The greatest contribution local LE can make to the HS intelligence collection 
process is to use the strengths of their core competencies and synthesize toward terrorism. 
The American police officer does not have to abandon any of the crime-prevention tools 
successfully developed over the past decades to meet the challenge of AQ and its cohorts. 
Ultimately, these crime-prevention tools, along with police professionalism, training, and 
wealth of real-world experience, will make America’s police forces the nation’s most 
valuable HS asset.210 
As Jonathan R. White states, in Defending the Homeland, “Someone in every 
American law enforcement agency should be assigned to collect and forward terrorist 
intelligence.”211 Local LE is not being overwhelmed with terrorist activity or 
intelligence; integrating a CT intelligence function can easily be applied to either existing 
209 “Building Communities of Trust: A Guidance for Community Leaders,” 7. 
210 Howard, “Hard Won Lessons: How Police Fight Terrorism in the United Kingdom,” 4. 
211 White, Defending the Homeland, 68. 
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criminal intelligence functions or as a specialized position based on the needs and 
resources of an individual agency.  
The final element of L.E.A.D. is the goal of the first three components, the 
detection of terrorists who may be planning, operating, or hiding within a local 
community. This thesis asserts that the question for local LE agencies without a CT 
strategy is, “Do you know the who, what, and how of terrorists in order to detect them, or 
are you relying on luck or the federal government to detect them within your 
jurisdiction?” 
E. DETECT  
The objective of the leadership, education, and gathering intelligence components 
related to terrorism are all ultimately directed at being able to identify the “bad guys” pre-
attack. No community in America can remain 100% immune from violence or terror, but 
local LE is duty bound to use all the tools and resources available, to protect, lead, and 
educate their citizenry in respect to terrorism. It is the view of this thesis that a failure to 
engage in CT at the local LE level not only creates a significant gap for overall U.S. HS, 
but is also a blatant negligence of duty.  
The task facing American police is not so much in the incorporation of new 
tactics or technologies, but in the establishment of a CT mindset into everyday LE 
operations. A simple strategy implementing CT planning, intelligence gathering, and 
community partnerships into existing police crime-prevention and response procedures 
will go a very long way toward making America’s communities hostile places for 
terrorists to operate.212 
Adding CT as a layer in the local LE policing package makes practical sense, in 
that locals are already using all their resources to “detect” violent and non-violent 
criminals within their jurisdictions. Potential terrorists, whether derived from domestic or 
international soil, pose the same threat to local communities as well known violent 
212 White, Defending the Homeland, 16. 
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criminals. All that is required for a local LE agency to detect terrorists is a change of 
mindset and an organizational wide commitment. 
F. IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the 21st century, the failure of local LE to engage in CT is an unacceptable 
condition, regardless of agency size, geographic location, or available resources. The 
L.E.A.D. model provides a simple and flexible model designed to assist any local LE 
entity to evolve from zero or little engagement in CT, to a comprehensive integration that 
becomes part of an agency’s DNA. L.E.A.D. is a progressive model reliant on following 
the steps in sequential order, but is based upon, by design, a low-tech, easy-to-develop 
and low-cost application that can be expanded into Anytown, USA.  
It is recommended that local LE agencies without a CT strategy consider L.E.A.D 
as an alternative to doing nothing. Local departments need only to envision themselves 
post-attack, and ask why they did not integrate CT into their policing strategies, when 
they may have had the opportunity to make a difference and save lives. As federal and 
state support is available in the form of training, guidance, funding, and partnerships to 
assist local LE in a CT mission, all that is required is for individual agencies to be willing 
and able.  
Presently, in the absence of state or federal mandates, local engagement in CT is 
left solely up to the 18,000 individual agencies across the United States. L.E.A.D 
provides a basic model for Anytown, USA to integrate CT into it existing mission, to 
harden its target and reduce the opportunity for terrorist activity within its community.  
G. WHAT DOES AN AGENCY USING L.E.A.D. LOOK LIKE? 
Small, medium, or large LE agencies that integrate the L.E.A.D. model into their 
policing mission will demonstrate and integrate the following components, but can adapt 
integration based on their own environment and ever-changing landscape. 
• Leadership: CT will be woven into all facets of their traditional duties, 
from everyday patrol, investigative work, to pre-planned events. CT will 
be viewed as a continual priority and not a passing trend. Domestic and 
international events, trends, and tactics related to terrorism will be applied 
to their CT application. The strengths of community policing, trust, and 
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partnerships, will be refined and continually applied to open dialogue and 
solicit information related to HS. 
• Education and Training: CT will be a key component of all levels of an 
agency’s training curriculum. New training related to terrorism will be 
continually sought out and an agency’s terrorism IQ will continue to 
mature and grow, and not remain the same and stagnate. An agency will 
continually seek out new opportunities to train and educate the local 
populous, other government agencies and the private sector; a constant 
work in progress that intersects with traditional policing duties. 
• Intelligence Gathering: Ensure all personnel have been properly trained 
on SAR and develop viable relationships with local FBI-JTTF and fusion 
centers for the sharing of information. Incorporate CT-based questioning 
into traditional policing, such as traffic stops, citizen interaction, and 
formal interviews. 
• Detect: Proactively work to protect local communities from the threat of 
terror by integrating the aforementioned components into an agency’s 
DNA by using traditional LE tactics to detect and mitigate terrorist 
activity. Utilize the strength of new and existing relationships to identify 
and deter radicalization with the use of community partnerships. Lastly, 
continually work to reduce complacency and keep CT relevant from a 
local perspective, regardless of the level of activity a community endures.  
H. CONCLUSION 
The case can clearly be made that an existential threat of terrorism exists and that 
local LE has the ability to contribute greatly with minimal disruption of their core 
services. LE can apply the strengths of their traditional mission toward terrorism with 
minimal resources, financial obligations, and restructuring. In addition, CT can be 
integrated into local communities through education, open dialogue, and applying CT in a 
dignified and transparent manner.  
The application of integrating an effective policing and CT strategy will take 
time, training (multiple dimensions) and coordination with state and federal partners. 
Using the strengths of CP to integrate a CT component in the overall strategy of securing 
local communities makes practical sense. Members of the community may have 
knowledge of terrorist activities but without the strong relationship between the police 
and the community, that information will not be brought forward to the authorities. In 
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fact, gaining intelligence to prevent future terrorist acts is one of the most important 
aspects of HS.213 This thesis reiterates again, “Local agencies that rely solely on the 
federal government to investigate terrorism in their communities, when they have the 
opportunity to make a significant contribution, do so at their own community’s risk.”  
With the proper implementation of L.E.A.D. and using the strengths of CP, local 
LE agencies can build a solid intelligence base in their community, which can serve to 
strengthen state and national HS efforts. Traditional crime fighting and CT efforts can 
complement each other and both effectively work toward the goal of protecting the 
citizenry of their jurisdiction. America’s genius has been and always will be its 
empowerment of local institutions. Empowering local commanders on the ground to 
make tactical decisions is how wars are won. Empowering local police to act as the front 
line for HS is how Americans can win the war on terror.214 
213 Chappell and Gibson, “Community Policing and Homeland Security Policing: Friend or Foe?,” 
330. 
214 Kelling and Bratton, “Policing Terrorism.” 
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